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I. INTRODUCTION
The illicit drug trade is gigantic. The United Nations reports that
the annual value of the illegal drug trade worldwide is 250 to 300 billion
dollars.' The United States leads the world in illicit drug consumption 2
and suffers a myriad of drug-related problems.3 The majority of mari-
juana, cocaine, and heroin consumed in the United States throughout
the 1980s was supplied by six Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries.4 These countries, like the United States, are plagued by drug-re-
lated problems. The governments and citizens of both drug producing
and drug transit countries are increasingly victims of crime, violence,
and corruption.5
Attendant to these increasing problems is a plethora of media cov-
erage that has sensationalized the drug issue. Studies have linked this
1. Address by Dr. Irving G. Tragen, Drug/Alcohol Education Training Seminar (July 5-9,
1989), reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. E3001, 3002 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1989) [hereinafter Address].
Some sources have estimated the worldwide trade to be as high as $500 billion. Regan, The Color
of Money Can Stop Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1989, at A19, col. 4.
2. See Address, supra note 1, at E3002 (stating that illegal drug sales in the United States
are approaching $200 billion and that 90% of the profits are made in the United States); see also
Presidential Certifications Regarding International Narcotics Control: Hearing and Markup
Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs House of
Rep. on H.R. 4162, H.J. Res. 491, 493, 495, 497 and 499, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Certification Hearing] (statement of Rep. Peter H. Kostmayer). The United States has 6% of
the world's population and consumes over 60% of the world's drugs. Id.
3. See France, Should We Fight or Switch?, A-B.A. J., Feb. 1990, at 43, 45. Drug-related
problems fall into two categories: problems that result from the use of drugs, such as rising addict
levels, hospital deaths, and AIDS cases; and problems that result from drug enforcement such as
skyrocketing prison populations, court case loads, and levels of violence and corruption.
4. See Bagley, Narco-Diplomacy: Drug Trafficking and U.S.-Latin American Relations, in
SELECT COMM. ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, 101ST CONG., 1ST SESs., DRUGS AND LATIN
AMERICA: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 75 (Comm. Print 1989) [here-
inafter POLICY OPTIONS] (edited transcript of a Congressional Research Service seminar). These
countries are Mexico, Colombia, Jamaica, Belize, Peru, and Bolivia. Id. at 77. The drug control
strategy has focused primarily on Colombia, the major manufacturer, and Peru and Bolivia, the
major cultivators, of cocaine.
5. "Over 221 court employees, including 42 judges . . . [and] hundreds of law enforcement
officials, journalists, politicians, and private citizens have ... been killed by the drug cartels. No
nation ... has paid a higher price in its efforts to combat drug trafficking than Colombia." 135
CONG. REC. E3484 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1989) (statement of Rep. Lawrence Coughlin). The increasing
drug problems in foreign countries are largely the result of antidrug efforts as opposed to drug use.
6. See P. SHOEMAKER, COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS ABOUT DRUGS 31-32 (1989) (discussing the
intermedia convergence on the drug issue); see also A. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR AND RADI-
CAL PROPOSALS THAT COULD MAKE AMERICA SAFE AGAIN 15-16 (1987) (recounting the story of a
U.S. News & World Report reporter who confessed to being a "Drug-Hype Junkie"). In the early
1980s, a growing public preoccupation with the drug problems in the United States fueled the
media "hype." Bagley, supra note 4, at 76.
1260
DRUG DIPLOMACY
media "hype" to political agenda setting by both candidates for public
office and the press itself. 7 Manipulating the drug issue for political
ends is not a new tactic,' but the practice culminated in the 1988 presi-
dential race, which provided an ideal forum for the "get tough" on
drugs theme."
Not surprisingly, the American public ranks the illegal drug trade
as its number one concern and the most important foreign policy issue
facing the United States. For example, a June 1988 national poll
showed that eighty-seven percent of the American people considered
drug trafficking a "very serious" problem in Central America.10 The
American mood toward drug control has reached the point of militancy,
and the United States government has been urged to declare war on
drugs.
The targets of this "war" have most often been drug suppliers
rather than drug consumers. Public opinion polls show that most Amer-
icans support drug policies that seek to limit the supply of drugs com-
ing into the United States rather than to curb the American demand
for drugs.11 The present supply-side enforcement policy has led the
United States to "force draft" foreign countries to fight the drug war on
their own soil. 12 Despite marginally successful diplomacy, unprece-
dented levels of funding,'" and strong public, media, and political sup-
port for the supply-side antidrug effort, the United States does not
appear to be winning the war on drugs. 4
This Note examines the United States drug control policy. Part II
7. See SHOEMAKER, supra note 6, at 47-65. Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" campaign was
itself an attempt at political agenda setting. Nightline: The Politics Behind the Newest Drug War
(ABC television broadcast, Sept. 4, 1989) (transcript on file at Vanderbilt Law Review).
8. R. SCHROEDER, THE POLITICS OF DRUGS 148-49 (1980); see POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 4,
at 107 (Ambassador Edwin G. Corr remarking that "White House statements and documents by
different administrations on narcotics control ... reveal[] a selective use of facts and data bases to
demonstrate the current administration's success").
9. See Bagley, supra note 4, at 75; see also Election-Year Anti-Drug Bill Enacted, 1988
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 85, 85-86 [hereinafter ALMANAC].
10. See Americans Want Military in Drug War, United Press Int'l (PM Cycle), June 2, 1988
(text available in LEXIS).
11. Id.
12. Bagley, supra note 4, at 87.
13. Between 1981 and 1987 the federal drug control budget tripled from $1.2 to $3.9 billion.
Bagley, supra note 4, at 78. The 1990 drug budget is $9.4 billion, four times more than the 1986
budget. 135 CONG. REC. E3326 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1989) (statement of Rep. Charles B. Rangel).
14. Review of the 1989 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Hearings Before
the Comm. on Foreign Affairs House of Rep., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1989) [hereinafter Strategy
Hearings] (testimony of Ann Wrobleski, Asst. Sec. to the Bureau of International Narcotics Mat-
ters (BINM), Dept. of State). "[Tlhe international war on narcotics is clearly not being won. In
fact, in some areas we appear to be slipping backwards." Id. at 62 (quoting letter from Secretary of
State James Baker to Congress).
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focuses on the supply-side, bilateral enforcement policy.15 Parts III, IV,
V, and VI, in the context of American domestic law, give an overview of
the United States aid leveraging system and of the major bilateral con-
trol programs such as the militarization of law enforcement, prosecution
of foreign traffickers in the United States, and crop eradication. This
overview analyzes the legal and extralegal arguments raised by foreign
countries against the programs and the diplomatic tactics pursued by
the United States in response.
Parts VII and VIII conclude that many of the diplomatic tactics
and the programs they support have been counterproductive and pro-
pose alternative policy options. In Part IX this Note concludes that no
amount of supply-side law enforcement will prevent drugs from enter-
ing the United States. The American public may have been persuaded
to support militant policies by promises of an impossible achievement.
II. THE SUPPLY-ORIENTED POLICY
In October 1982, President Reagan declared war on drugs.16 His
administration's drug control strategy called for more law enforcement
efforts aimed at reducing supply and demand and less domestic treat-
ment, prevention, and education. 7 This policy placed a greater empha-
sis on supply-side law enforcement than ever before. It focused on
breaking the trafficking link of the supply chain by interdicting drug
smuggling craft at the American borders and by extraditing top-level
drug traffickers. 8 Although the Reagan Administration insisted that
drug control was a top foreign policy priority, the drug issue was subor-
dinated to other policy interests, such as fighting communism.'9
Dissatisfied with both the Reagan Administration's reluctance to
use aid leveraging for drug diplomacy and the results of its drug strat-
15. Since its inception, drug control and supply-side methods have gone hand in hand. See
generally A. TAYLOR, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC, 1900-1939 (1969). The
chain of the drug supply to United States consumers consists of the cultivation, manufacture, and
traffic of drugs. Control at the source, or cultivation stage, has almost always been the predomi-
nant goal of United States policy. See generally id. The actual implementation by the United
States of supply-side programs in other countries did not begin until the 1970s. See infra notes 95-
99 and accompanying text.
16. See Reagan Cracking Down on Drugs, United Press Int'l (PM Cycle), Oct. 13, 1982
(quoting from national radio address by President Reagan on Oct. 3, 1982).
17. The drug law enforcement budget rose from $468.1 million in 1979 to $695 million in
1982, while the treatment budget declined from $404.8 million to $206.4 million in the same pe-
riod. Kirschten, Reagan's Crime-Fighting Proposals-Shoot First and then Load the Gun?, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 13, 1982, at 1934.
18. See Note, The Extraterritorial War on Cocaine: Perspective from Bolivia and Colombia,
12 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 39, 41-45 (1988) (discussing the Reagan Administration's interdiction
strategy).
19. Bagley, supra note 4, at 83-84.
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egy,20 and in the belief that ineffective diplomacy was largely responsi-
ble for the failing drug war, Congress passed amendments to the
Foreign Assistance Act that allowed it to suspend aid to a noncooperat-
ing country21 and created a power that Congress did not hesitate to
exercise.2
In 1986 public pressure for increased drug control efforts had
mounted, and one month before the 1986 congressional elections, Con-
gress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (the 1986 Act), which
created a certification system of aid leveraging.2 3 The 1986 Act estab-
lished drug control as a top foreign policy priority and made aid lever-
aging a tool for pressuring foreign governments to engage in law
enforcement measures such as crop eradication, law enforcement milita-
rization, extradition of foreign nationals, and mutual legal assistance for
prosecution. Under this strategy, seventy-five percent of the total drug
budget was earmarked for supply-side control programs.2 4
Despite the array of seizure, prosecution, and eradication statistics
that resulted from these efforts, the drug supply to the United States
increased from 1986 to 1988.5 Disillusioned with the supply-oriented
strategy and once again facing re-election, Congress passed the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (the 1988 Act).26 This Act earmarked fifty per-
cent of the fiscal year 1989 drug budget for domestic demand controls
and mandated that in subsequent years, sixty percent of the budget
would go to demand control programs.
The 1988 Act suggested movement toward a demand-oriented pol-
20. Narcotics Control Strategy Report Released, 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 80, 80-81 (Apr. 1986).
21. See 22 U.S.C. § 2413 (1988) (as amended by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-570, § 2005, 100 Stat. 3207-61 to -62 (1986)) (authorizing the withholding of aid to drug
producing countries).
22. The House cancelled $7.2 million in Economic Support Funds and froze $200 million in
U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) funds. Note, supra note 18, at 52.
23. Bagley, supra note 4, at 78-79. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100
Stat. 3207 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Act]. Although this Act was characterized as a comprehensive
antidrug statute, it largely neglected demand-side programs. The Act earmarked $214 million for
demand reduction, see id. § 4002, 100 Stat. 3207-103, but appropriated $7 million for Justice De-
partment helicopters, id. § 3421, 100 Stat. 3207-103, $93.5 million for Customs aircraft, id. § 3141,
100 Stat. 3207-93, and $277.5 million for Department of Defense (DOD) interdiction equipment,
id. § 3052, 100 Stat. 3207-74.
24. Bagley, supra note 4, at 84-85.
25. See The Worldwide Drug Situation and International Narcotics Control Programs:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs House of Rep., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987) [here-
inafter Worldwide Hearing] (statement of Rep. Lawrence J. Smith, reporting that from 1986 to
1987 opium production increased by 30%, marijuana production increased by 20%, and cocaine
production increased by 10%).
26. Bagley, supra note 4, at 87-88; see Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
102 Stat. 4181 (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Act]; see also ALMANAC, supra note 9 (summarizing the
provisions of the 1988 Act).
27. Bagley, supra note 4, at 88.
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icy, but no transition has actually occurred. Although demand-side
funding has increased, supply-side funding has continued to rise as
well. 28 In addition, although the demand-side increases were earmarked
primarily for law enforcement, education, and treatment activities, the
funds actually authorized by Congress in fiscal year 1989 did not meet
the levels necessary to achieve the lofty goals of the 1988 Act.29 As a
result, the 1988 Act remains only a symbolic commitment to treatment,
education, and state and local law enforcement.
Moreover, supply-side funding has not diminished. The 1988 Act
made few changes in the bilateral supply-side strategies of the 1986
Act,30 but did call for increased multilateral and regional cooperation.3 1
Subsequent United States efforts have resulted in the United Nations'
adoption of a multilateral treaty on illicit drug control that incorporates
many of the United States enforcement programs.32 In addition, at a
1990 hemispheric drug summit, the Bolivian, Colombian, and Peruvian
governments promised to use their best efforts to increase cooperation
in drug control and the United States agreed to provide economic aid if
antidrug efforts hurt any of the countries' economies.33
28. Id. at 91.
29. Id. at 90-91. The 1988 Act called for treatment of addicts within one week of a request
for help and for construction of facilities for this purpose. Id. at 90. Yet in 1989, only one in four
addicts who demanded treatment was accommodated. 135 CONG. REC. S12,657-01 (daily ed. Oct. 5,
1989) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden). Moreover, these individuals waited an average of eight
months after application to receive help. Id. Funds appropriated for treatment in 1990 will not
even be sufficient to treat one-quarter of the United States addicts who are pregnant. Nightline:
Reaction to Bush's Anti-Drug Speech (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 5, 1989) (transcript on file
at Vanderbilt Law Review). The emphasis now placed on demand-side law enforcement efforts is
reflected by increasing use of measures such as drug testing. See generally Special Project, Gov-
ernment Drug Testing: A Question of Reasonableness, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1343 (1990). In 1990 no
federal funds will be provided for state and local prisons, and only 1% of state and local law
enforcement efforts are federally funded. Barrett, Drug Czar Bennett, Once Supreme In His
Realm, Is Himself in Revolt Over Obstacles In His Path, Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1989, at A16, col. 2.
30. Compare 1988 Act, supra note 26 with 1986 Act, supra note 23. For a synopsis of the
provisions of the 1988 Act, see ALMANAC, supra note 9, at 87-88.
31. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 4101-08, 82 Stat. 4181, 4263-67
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1988)).
32. UN Narcotics Conference Adopts Convention, 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 49 (Apr. 1989) (text of
Convention adopted by the U.N. Conference for the Adoption of a Convention Against Illicit Traf-
fic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances). The treaty includes U.S.-style laws on money
laundering, asset forfeiture, mutual legal assistance, police training, extradition, crop eradication,
and chemical control. See id. For a discussion of the existing system of multilateral controls, see
Note, International Narcotics Control: A Proposal to Eradicate an International Menace, 14 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 530 (1984). In practice, this system regulates only legitimate drug industries, but does
serve as a foundation for the United States' bilateral agreements involving the control of illicit
drugs.
33. Hunt, Bush Vows Trade Help for "Anti-Drug Cartel," The Tennessean, Feb. 16, 1990, at
1A, col. 4. At the summit, the four countries' leaders dealt only with broad drug control themes in
order to maintain harmony. Id. at 1A, col. 5. The South American leaders refused United States
military assistance but signed a communiqu6 stating that each country may use its own military in
1264
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Despite the mandate of the 1988 Act, bilateral supply-side efforts
are apparently increasing. The International Narcotics Control Act of
1989 s1 foreshadows future increases in supply-side efforts. More funds
for supply-side initiatives are being generated from other budgets such
as the defense budget.3 5 Despite more zealous enforcement efforts dur-
ing 1989, drug supplies have continued to increase.36
The 1990 drug control strategy remains basically the same,3 7 but
increases diplomatic pressure on foreign countries for more military and
crop spraying programs.38 Because of the decreasing threat of spreading
communism, the Bush Administration, unlike its predecessor, may ac-
tually make drug control a top foreign policy issue.
its territory. Id. President Bush promised to enhance demand-side efforts, id. at 1A, col. 4, and to
increase economic assistance to the three countries. Id. at 6A, col. 4. Yet, no specified amount of
aid was established and President Bush stated that there would be no immediate economic aid
increases. Id. at 6A, col. 5. The United States has already promised an increase of $206 million in
1990 for increased military, law enforcement, and economic assistance to Bolivia, Colombia, and
Peru. The Tennessean, Feb. 15, 1990, at 5A, col. 1. Yet, no specific allocations of economic aid have
been made.
34. International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, 101 P.L. 231, H.R. 3611, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Act]. The 1989 Act contains 16 sections. Eight of these sections deal
with law enforcement and military assistance. See id. §§ 3 (authorizing military and law enforce-
ment assistance of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru), 4 (requiring acquisition by Special Defense Ac-
quisition Fund of defense articles for drug control), 5 (providing excess defense articles for certain
major illicit drug producing countries), 6 (waiving Brooke-Alexander amendment for major coca
producing countries), 11 (urging creation of a multilateral antinarcotics strike force), 12 (prohibit-
ing weapons transfers to international drug traffickers), 13 (offering up to $2 million for informa-
tion concerning acts of international terrorism), and 15 (amending the Mansfield Amendment,
which deals with participation in foreign police actions). Four of the sections relate to aid leverag-
ing. See id. §§ 7 (discussing aid certification for Mexico), 8 (waiving certification procedures for
drug-transit countries meeting certain requirements), 9 (urging the coordination of trade policies
and drug control objectives), and 10 (authorizing debt-for-drugs exchanges as of Oct. 1, 1990).
Section 14 of the 1989 Act waives the Burmese Amendment, which prohibits the use of United
States assistance to grow crops in a foreign country that would compete with crops grown in the
United States, for fiscal year 1990 to the extent that it applies to crop substitution projects in
furtherance of drug control.
35. See Gest, Soldiers Can't Beat Smugglers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 30, 1988, at 18
(charting fiscal year increases in the Pentagon budget for drug interdiction from $4 million in 1982
to $94 million in 1988). Ironically, in 1987 Congress decreased the Coast Guard budget by $103
million. Id.
36. See Strategy Hearings, supra note 14, at 347 (Rep. Lawrence J. Smith reporting "growth
upwards, eradication downwards, flow more, processing more, less extraditions, . . . more fear").
The world supply of illicit drugs has increased to the extent that the drug traffickers are now
exploring new markets in Europe, the Soviet Union, and even their own countries. Id. at 11 (testi-
mony of Ann Wrobleski). This extension of the drug trade has fueled international interest in the
drug issues. Id.
37. Bagley, supra note 4, at 85.
38. See Berke, Bush's Drug Plan Aims at Capturing Mid-Level Figures, N.Y. Times, Aug.
31, 1989, at Al, col. 3 (stating that the Bush Administration's new strategy will de-emphasize extra-
dition of kingpins and re-emphasize interdiction). See 1989 Act, supra note 34. The current strat-
egy employs 41% of the supply-side budget for eradication programs and 37% for interdiction.
Strategy Hearings, supra note 14, at 20, 30.
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Significantly, United States policy may be changing in one impor-
tant respect: recognition of drug control in foreign countries as an eco-
nomic and trade issue rather than as solely a moral and law
enforcement one. For example, the 1990 drug summit addressed the ec-
onomic aspects of drug control and the 1989 Act will provide annual
debt forgiveness and relaxed crop growing restrictions to Colombia, Bo-
livia, or Peru if they cooperate to stem the flow of cocaine to the United
States. 9 These economic incentives are clearly diplomatic leveraging
tools, but whether they mark a larger trend in United States drug con-
trol policy is uncertain. The 1988 Act, despite its rhetorical commit-
ment to monetary assistance for crop conversion and alternative
employment programs, did not actually authorize any additional assis-
tance. The Act required the President to ask Congress for any addi-
tional aid necessary to fulfill the terms of the 1990 Hemispheric Drug
Summit,40 but no aid was promised as a result of the summit. President
Bush has discouraged all nonmilitary assistance for 1990.41 Under the
Bush Administration, economic development assistance would not be-
gin until 1991, presumably after the drug producing countries have con-
trol over their territories through law enforcement measures. 2
III. AID LEVERAGING AS A DIPLOMATIC TOOL FOR BILATERAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS
The existing system of aid leveraging was established in the 1989
Act. Under this system, United States aid to the twenty-four major
drug producing or drug transit countries is withheld unless the Presi-
dent certifies that the particular country has "cooperated fully" in drug
law enforcement efforts.43 In addition, the United States representative
to each of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) will vote against
multilateral loans for any country not receiving the President's certifi-
cation.44 The President may waive an aid suspension based on vital na-
39. See 1989 Act, supra note 34, §§ 6 & 10. In a previous draft of the 1989 Act, the drug
producing countries would not have been entitled to these benefits unless they agreed to eradicate
coca plants by aerial herbicidal spraying. See H.R. 3611, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., § 17, 135 CONG. REc.
H8411, H8414-15 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1989) (amending § 485 of Chapter 8 of Part I of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961).
40. 1989 Act, supra note 34, § 2(e).
41. See 135 CONG. REc. H8418 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1989). The United States has already
promised to give the Andean countries $2.2 billion over the next five years for military and eco-
nomic functions in the drug war. Hunt, Bush Vows Trade Help for "Anti-Drug Cartel," The Ten-
nessean, Feb. 16, 1990, at 6A, col. 5. Because of the Bush Administration's strategy, most of this
aid will likely go to law enforcement efforts until 1991.
42. 135 CoNG. REc. H8418 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1989) (statement of Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman).
43. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, §§ 4401-4408, 102 Stat. 4181, 4275-84
(1988).
44. The U.S. votes do not carry enough weight alone to deny assistance. Certification Hear-
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tional interests of the United States. In 1988 Congress enacted the
Chiles Amendment that required decertification of any major drug pro-
ducing or transit country that does not have a specific, bilateral drug
control agreement with the United States."'
This implicitly coercive type of diplomacy has been termed "big
stick" diplomacy. Congress supports big stick diplomacy because it has
at times convinced foreign countries to implement the United States
law enforcement programs.46 Yet, aid leveraging has just as often
spawned negative reactions from foreign governments.47 For the past
two decades and primarily since the inception of the present certifica-
tion system, Congress and the executive branch have disagreed funda-
mentally on aid leveraging's role in diplomacy.48
In making certification decisions, the executive branch has distin-
guished drug control cooperation from drug control results. Although
governments may be implementing the United States programs, other
factors such as economics, violence, and insurgency have impeded the
intended results. Thus, in 1988 President Reagan created a third cate-
gory consisting of certified countries that are warned to do more in the
future.49 In 1989 -President Bush placed six countries in this category.50
Congress has often stated that the executive branch places too
much emphasis on preserving national sovereignty, puts other foreign
policy objectives before drug control, and thus, certifies noncooperative
ings, supra note 2, at 163.
45. Strategy Hearings, supra note 14, at 71. The agreement must discuss eradication, in-
terdiction, demand control, and law enforcement cooperation. Id.
46. Certification Hearing, supra note 2, at 32 (statement of Rep. Lawrence J. Smith). As
Rep. Smith stated, "experience has shown... the salutary effects of applying pressure to drug-
producing countries. In 1986, . . . Congressionally-imposed sanctions. . . led the Bolivians to un-
dertake Operation Blast Furnace. In 1987 sanctions led to the first eradication program in Bolivia's
history." Id.
47. See, e.g., Letter from Bahamian Attorney General to Ann Wrobleski (Mar. 28, 1988),
reprinted in Certification Hearing, supra note 2, at 174. The letter expresses outrage at Congress's
attempt to suspend aid to the Bahamas and poses the following question: "If corruption is needed
to move [drugs] . . . through The Bahamas. . . why is it not needed to successfully deliver these
shipments into Florida?" Id. at 176.
48. See Strategy Hearings, supra note 14, at 347 (statement of Rep. Lawrence J. Smith).
After talking to State Department members, Representative Smith concluded that the U.S. is "giv-
ing them the carrot and usually hitting ourselves over the head with the stick" and proposed a
"carrot and a carrot" approach. Id. See generally Note, U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid to
Nations Which Do Not Cooperate with the U.S. to Combat International Drug Traffic, 7 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 361 (1974).
49. See Wrobleski, Presidential Certification of Narcotics Source Countries, 88 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 47, 48 (June 1988) ("sending a signal to Colombia and Mexico").
50. Wrobleski, Global Narcotics Cooperation and Presidential Certification, 89 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 49 (Oct. 1989) (giving warnings to the Bahamas, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and
Peru).
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countries.51 Congress believes that the programs will succeed, despite
violence and economic problems, with stronger United States and for-
eign commitment to them. As a result, in 1987 Congress proposed to
suspend aid to five countries that the President had certified.2
Certainly the United States is able to decide whether its aid will go
to a particular country. Yet foreign governments have challenged what
they believe is dictation of their internal policies through coercion. This
criticism applies particularly to the United States policy of voting
against MDB loan programs for noncooperative countries. Congress has
passed amendments to the appropriations for the MDBs that allow the
United States to vote against loans to narcotics-producing countries.53
Yet, the charters of the MDBs provide that only economic considera-
tions, not political ones, should control the decision making process of
the MDB members.5" Thus, the United States policy of voting based on
narcotics control considerations arguably violates its treaty obligations.
Foreign governments primarily are concerned that big stick diplo-
51. See, e.g., Certification Hearing, supra note 2, at 32 (statement of Lawrence J. Smith,
Chairman of the Task Force on Narcotics of the House Foreign Affairs Committee). Rep. Smith
stated: "We demean the certification process, our own law, and our own anti-drug efforts, by certi-
fying proven non-cooperators. . . . [W]e hide behind the excuses that seem to pass for 'full coop-
eration' these days". Id. At this Certification Hearing, Rep. Smith further stated:
You [the Committee on Foreign Affairs] also will hear, no doubt, about the dire consequences
of de-certification. I personally do not believe that there will be much a down side from these
governments. I do not know what more they can do to us . ..
. . . And if we say we have a drug policy and we are going to prevent growth in traffick-
ing, we then do not lie down with the dogs and come up with the fleas, which everyone can see
and which therefore they use as a basis for saying, they [the United States] do not mean it
anyway. They are all bark and no bite ....
It is time for the United States Congress to stand up and take the political lead. We
cannot rely on the President solely to make these determinations . . . because the executive
branch is too timid to take them [the Noriegas of the world] on.
Id. at 52-53. In 1989, Rep. Smith reported that "the [certification] report once again takes a head-
in-the-sand view. . . [in that] the only countries decertified are those reflecting a political agenda
.... [T]his charade fools fewer and fewer people each year. I do not believe it fools those of us in
Congress who follow these issues." Strategy Hearings, supra note 14, at 55. The present
"mandatory" aid suspension system places the U.S. in the position of either maintaining a duplici-
tous policy or offending foreign and even U.S. interests.
52. Certification Hearing, supra note 2, at 156-61. These countries were The Bahamas, Bo-
livia, Paraguay, Peru, and Mexico. Note that Congress would hold all of the countries to the Co-
lombian standard of cooperation. In early 1990, however, Colombian cooperation appeared to be
backsliding. See, e.g., Won't Deploy "Drug Bugs" Without Consent, U.S. Says, Tennessean, Feb.
21, 1990, at 4A, col. 6 (stating that the Colombian government pardoned 35 guerillas who partici-
pated in a 1985 attack on the Palace of Justice).
53. 22 U.S.C. § 284(k) (1988) (International Development Association and International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development); 22 U.S.C. § 285(p) (1988) (Asian Development Bank).
54. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
art. IV, § 10 & art. III, § 4, July 1, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134 (1947);
Agreement Establishing The Asian Development Bank, Dec. 4, 1965, art. 36, § 4 & art. 14, 17
U.S.T. 1419, T.I.A.S. 6103, 571 U.N.T.S. 123.
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macy and the resulting programs infringe on their states' sovereignty.
Under international law, a sovereign nation's jurisdiction to engage in
coercive activity within its territory is generally exclusive.5 Therefore,
the United States would need a foreign government's consent to use
force within the foreign territory. In practice, however, whether any ac-
tion taken by the United States in another nation is coercive and viola-
tive of the nation's sovereignty depends on that nation's assessment of
the particular act.58 Traditionally, civil law states have been extremely
sensitive to any action, even the taking of depositions, by foreign offi-
cials or representatives in their territory. South Americans are particu-
larly suspect of United States actions.
Based on past dealings by the United States with these countries,
their suspicions seem well-founded. South American nationals view the
drug control programs, often implemented as a result of aid leveraging,
as a violation of their nations' sovereignty, despite their governments'
acquiescence.57 Thus, foreign officials are often unwilling to make public
accessions to the programs because they are politically unpalatable. The
governments and citizens of these countries have consistently main-
tained that the United States demand for drugs has caused the drug
problem and is ruining their countries."'
These countries view the aid certification system as a continuation
of arbitrary and unfair dealing by the United States. Application of the
present system has held different countries to different standards of co-
operation.5" Yet, a few South American countries have reaped the bene-
55. See Paikin, Problems of Obtaining Evidence in Foreign States for Use in Federal Crimi-
nal Prosecutions, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 232, 235 (1984) (discussing limits on enforcement
jurisdiction in the territory of another state). Generally, law enforcement agents' actions are per-
mitted in foreign territory.
56. Id. at 236.
57. International Narcotics Control: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse
and Control House of Rep., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1984) [hereinafter International Hearing]
(statement of Dominick DiCarlo, Asst. Sec. BINM, Dept. of State) (stating that "some of these
governments . . . [point out] that when they do something in answer to the narcotics problem,
even though . . . out of self-interest, immediately the accusation goes up that they are doing it
because of pressure from Big Brother North America, even though it is inaccurate").
58. See, e.g., Duffy, Now, For the Real Drug War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 11, 1989,
at 18 (quoting Colombia's President Virgilio Barco as saying: "Those of you who depend on co-
caine have created the largest, most vicious criminal enterprise the world has ever known").
59. Bagley, supra note 4, at 83.
President Reagan never used his powers to punish a close U.S. ally. In 1988, for example, the
Reagan Administration decertified only four nations-Iran, Syria, Afghanistan and Pan-
ama-none of which were recipients of U.S. economic or military assistance[.] Strategically
important Turkey, in contrast, was not even mentioned on Reagan's State Department list,
even though the DEA classified it as a major heroin-transiting country. In the Asian heroin-
producing countries, most of which share borders with Communist nations, the struggle
against Communist expansion consistently received diplomatic priority over the anti-drug war
from Reagan. Likewise, the Reagan White House never imposed sanctions on Pakistan, even
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fit of these inconsistencies."0
In the final analysis, however, many countries implement the
United States programs, whether out of self-interest or economic pres-
sure. In addition, the United States has demonstrated its willingness to
engage in big stick diplomacy regardless of the potential economic, po-
litical, and diplomatic reverberations. In his 1989 drug plan President
Bush proposed replacing the aid certification system with a system that
would reward cooperating countries by offering them additional aid."
The executive branch generally believes that this system would be more
conducive to cooperative drug control efforts, but no change appears
forthcoming from Congress.
IV. CROP ERADICATION
Crop eradication is a particularly volatile issue in foreign countries
because it is often directed at peasants who grow drug crops to support
their families. Bolivian growers, in particular, are opposed to crop con-
trol because coca growing was legal in Bolivia until 1988. In addition,
coca still has many legitimate uses in the traditional cultivating
countries.2
Traditional crop control programs favored the strategy of crop sub-
stitution. Substitution programs were conducted by the United States
and United Nations throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, but they
were expensive and produced disappointing results.3 Subsequent crop
control systems were based on the belief that crop substitution pro-
grams cannot be effective unless supplemented by eradication efforts.
Today, the system emphasizes crop eradication at the expense of sub-
stitution programs. Subsidies for crop substitution are contingent on a
though that country was a major source of heroin, or on the Afghani "freedom fighters," de-
spite their deep involvement in opium cultivation and trafficking. Indeed, when President
Reagan met with a group of Afghan guerrilla leaders in November 1987, he reportedly did not
even broach the topic of drug trafficking with them.
Id.
60. For example, the United States continued relations with General Manuel Noriega of Pan-
ama until his indictment despite evidence of drug involvement. Id. Similarly, Nicaraguan contra
and Honduran involvement has been downplayed by the U.S. government. Id. at 83-84.
61. Berke, supra note 38, at Al, col. 3 & A8, col. 1. The debt forgiveness provision of the
1989 Act is an incentive-based leveraging device rather than a punitive one. See 1989 Act, supra
note 34, § 10.
62. See Note, Extradition Treaty Improvements, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 285, 296 n.87
(stating that Andean nations have used coca leaves in religious ceremonies for 3000 years and that
coca leaves relieve hunger, fatigue, and cold); see also infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
63. See Note, Trends in Extraterritorial Narcotics Control: Slamming the Stable Door Af-
ter the Horse Has Bolted, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 353, 404-06 & nn.300-01 (1984) (criticizing




successful eradication program.64 The United States Bureau of Interna-
tional Narcotics Management (BINM) has recognized coca eradication
as its top priority.65
The United States now has eradication programs in approximately
twenty-three countries.6 The method of eradication varies among the
common drug crops. All coca eradication and most poppy eradication is
done manually. Manual eradication is extremely difficult, however, and
none of the manual eradication programs have been successful.6 7 In par-
ticular, coca control is virtually impossible through manual eradica-
tion, 8 which has led Peru to begin testing herbicides to develop a safe
and effective aerial program for coca eradication. In spite of these ef-
forts, overall coca and poppy cultivation have increased. 9
All marijuana eradication is done aerially by herbicidal spraying,70
and these programs have achieved limited success in reducing foreign
production. Reductions of foreign crops, however, have encouraged
growers in the United States to produce a greater supply of marijuana
domestically,7 1 so that displacement remains a drawback to eradication
efforts. As a result, the government now acknowledges that in order to
effectively decrease drug supplies to the United States, it would have to
control all areas of cultivation simultaneously. 73 In addition to the
problems associated with displacement, many of the programs have
failed as a result of external factors such as violence and insurgency.
A. Economics and Ecology As Diplomacy Issues
Foreign countries have been slow to accept crop eradication pro-
grams not only because of their independence as national sovereigns,
but also because of economic and ecological considerations. The eco-
nomic impact of crop eradication is intimately tied to the sovereignty of
64. The U.S. AID fund requires that 70% of a farmer's coca be eradicated before crop con-
version assistance will be given. 135 CONG. REc. S12,144 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter).
65. Whitehead, U.S. International Narcotics Control Programs and Policies, 86 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 37, 39 (Oct. 1986).
66. Wrobleski, supra note 49, at 47.
67. See Wrobleski, supra note 50, at 49 (reporting that "Peru eradicated 5130 hectares of
coca-possibly offsetting for the first time any expansion of Peru's coca crop which has been in-
creasing by an estimated 10% a year"). Yet, Peru still cultivates more coca than any other country.
Id. at 57.
68. Id. at 49, 50, 57.
69. Id. at 49.
70. See generally id. at 51-52.
71. See generally id. at 52. The United States is the world's third largest marijuana pro-
ducer. Id.
72. Progress in one country causes a shift to a more vulnerable one. Id. at 49.
73. International Hearing, supra note 57, at 31 (testimony of Dominick DiCarlo).
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the largest drug producing countries. Those countries and their citizens
oppose the crop destruction programs because narcotics cultivation is
often a way of life and an essential part of the economy.74 For example,
in Bolivia in 1988, the income generated from cocaine exports exceeded
eight hundred million dollars, which is equal to the aggregate value of
all of its other legal exports.75 Congressional research suggests that suc-
cessful eradication programs in these countries would destroy their
economies by creating massive unemployment, migration to the cities
from the country, immigration to the United States, and currency
devaluation.7"
The United States and United Nations do conduct crop substitu-
tion programs to try to ameliorate the consequences of eradication.
United States programs, however, are underfunded, are only available
for traditional growing areas irrespective of a region's economic condi-
tions, and are contingent on eradication of large amounts of a grower's
drug crop. As a result of efforts by the United States, United Nations
aid programs have also been linked to drug control efforts." Moreover,
crop substitution is often not viable when it is available.7
Although the United States appears to be ready to address these
problems through proposals such as debt forgiveness and economic aid
for alternative employment, the United States has recently exacerbated
economic problems in several drug producing countries by facilitating
the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement.79 In addition, Amer-
ican economic assistance is still contingent on foreign enforcement co-
operation. Ironically, the United States has been simultaneously
74. For example, cocaine cultivation provides employment for approximately 350,000 Boliv-
ian peasants, at least 200,000 Peruvian peasants, and approximately 40,000 Colombian individuals.
The depressed lawful economies and coca economy have integrated. POLCY OPTIONs, supra note 4,
at V, VII (executive summary of seminar).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. International Hearing, supra note 57, at 33.
78. No crop has yet to produce the economic yields that drug crops do, alternative crops are
often not even marketable, and drug crops grow during the dry season in remote areas with bad
soil conditions. Although § 14 of the 1989 Act waives the restriction on United States assistance for
growing crops that will compete with similar corps grown in the United States, this allowance will
not solve the crop substitution problems. See 1989 Act, supra note 34, § 14.
79. See Fricker, A Judiciary Under Fire, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1990, 54, 57. Because the U.S. gov-
ernment was upset about Colombia's trading with "Iron Curtain" countries, the U.S. representa-
tive to the International Coffee Organization caused the International Coffee Agreement to
collapse by suggesting to other countries that they might lose United States military aid if they
favored price supports for Colombia. Id. Coffee is Colombia's main source of income. The collapse
of the International Coffee Agreement will cost Colombia an estimated $500 million annually. 135
CONG. REc. S16,807 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden). Section 9 of the
1989 Act supports a presidential review of whether the International Coffee Agreement negotia-
tions should be resumed. See 1989 Act, supra note 34, § 9.
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pressuring some South American countries to resist industrial develop-
ment, which would lessen the economic impact of crop eradication, in
order to preserve the rain forests.80
Rain forest preservation may also be inconsistent with the United
States policy of herbicide use for crop eradication. In 1989, however, the
United States claimed that the possible use of herbicides was the most
misunderstood issue in its drug control efforts.8" The government also
emphasized that its program provides for use of only safe and effective
chemicals and for close monitoring of potential negative effects.
Nevertheless, foreign countries and citizens remain concerned
about the health and environmental impact of chemical use in crop
eradication. They point out that at least some of the herbicides are con-
sidered carcinogenic by the National Cancer Institute.2 In addition,
contaminated food crops, water, and drugs may be consumed by un-
wary citizens. Such health concerns are not unfounded, as evidenced in
1989 when Burmese Armed Forces misused United States eradication
aircraft and a carcinogenic herbicide to spray ethnic minorities in
northern opium growing areas. 83
Environmentalists believe that the herbicides could kill rare plants
and animals and prevent future plant growth by poisoning the soil.
Such environmental concerns have been voiced not only abroad but
within the United States as well. Recently, the scientist in charge of the
United States herbicide studies resigned his position to protest a lack of
concern for long-term environmental consequences.8 4 In addition, cer-
tain chemical and pharmaceutical companies have refused to sell partic-
ular chemicals to the United States government because of potential
product liability actions.8 5
In defense of its eradication programs, the United States points out
that foreign countries use United States domestic chemical testing stan-
dards, which are much higher than international ones.88 The govern-
ment also points out that some of the protested chemicals are
80. See Lemonick, What Can Americans Do?, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 85.
81. Wrobleski, supra note 50, at 50.
82. 134 CONG. REC. S12,142 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1988) (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moy-
nihan); see also infra note 99.
83. 134 CONG. REC. S12,142 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1988) (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick
Moynihan).
84. PoLICY OPTrONs, supra note 4, at 30 (statement of Gustavo Gorriti).
85. The most notable refusal was made by Eli Lilly, the manufacturer of spike, a chemical
defoliant believed effective in destroying coca plants. See Eli Lilly "Spikes" Plan to Poison Co-
caine Crop, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 13, 1988, at 52. As a result of this refusal, the United
States government has threatened to give the company's patent to a more cooperative company.
Id. Future negotiations are anticipated. Dow Chemical and DuPont are also worried about poten-
tial product liability suits. Id.
86. Wrobleski, supra note 50, at 50.
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commonly used in the United States87 and that other precautions, such
as the use of pellets to minimize chemical drift, are taken when spray-
ing. The State Department suggests that the danger to food supplies is
minimal because, in the areas targeted for spraying, only about twenty
percent of the farmers grow food crops.8 8 In addition, the eradication
program in Myanmar (formerly known as Burma)8 9 has been discontin-
ued due to its misuse of United States assistance and Myanmar has
been decertified under the United States aid program.90 Finally, the
United States believes that debates on the negative environmental ef-
fects of herbicide use are superficial because the narcotics growers are
destroying forests to clear areas for crops, and the narcotics processors
are dumping the chemicals that they use.91 Ironically, the United States
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates that eighty percent
of the chemicals used by the drug processors are exported from the
United States.92
In August 1989 Congress enacted the Chemical Diversion and Traf-
ficking Act that provides new export controls for drug producing chemi-
cals. 3 In addition, the 1988 United Nations treaty outlines broad norms
for chemical sales control. At present, however, little money has been
provided to monitor the United States exports.9 4
87. Eli Lilly "Spikes" Plan to Poison Cocaine Crop, supra note 85, at 52.
88. Wrobleski, supra note 50, at 51.
89. The United Nations formally adopted the country's name change in June 1989. Burma
Out, Myammar In, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1989, § 1, at 14, col. 4.
90. See 134 CONG. REc. S12,142 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1988) (statement of Sen. Daniel Patrick
Moynihan) (reporting that Burmese armed forces used eradication chemicals supplied by the
United States to spray ethnic minorities); Wrobleski, supra note 50, at 54 (reporting that the
United States suspended aid to Burma).
91. Wrobleski, supra note 50, at 50. Some environmentalists have accepted herbicide use as a
means of stopping the drug trade from damaging the environment. Id. at 51.
Environmentalists have also disagreed over the United States most recent crop destruction
technique. Won't Deploy "Drug Bugs" Without Consent, U.S. Says, Tennessean, Feb. 21, 1990, at
4A, col. 6. The United States has been conducting research concerning the malumbia, a white moth
that eats coca plants while in its caterpillar stage. Id. at 4A, col. 5. An Agricultural Research Ser-
vice administrator believes that a sufficient number of these caterpillars could defoliate the South
American coca plants. Id. at 4A, col. 6. The Administrator added that "this is quite a voracious
caterpillar." Id.
The Bolivian and Peruvian governments apparently do not approve of the United States new
concept of biological drug warfare. The Peruvian Ambassador met with United States officials im-
mediately after hearing news reports of the caterpillar research for assurance that the United
States would not use the caterpillar without Peru's consent. Id. at 4A, col. 5. A Bolivian official
predicted that his country would reject the use of biological agents because of the same environ-
mental concerns that have prompted it to reject the use of chemical agents. Id. Yet, the Bush
Administration has proposed a $5 million increase (over the $1.5 million that will be spent in 1990)
for 1991 research.
92. Andreas, Briefings: Circle of Cocaine, GREENPEACE, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 17.
93. See Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1988).
94. Andreas, supra note 92, at 17.
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B. Crop Control and Aid Leveraging
Turkey agreed to the first crop controls in 1971 in consideration for
a foreign aid package. This agreement arose after Congress threatened
to suspend aid to Turkey. Turkey is generally regarded as the United
States' primary aid leveraging success because Turkey has never re-
emerged as a major supplier of heroin to the United States 5 Subse-
quent to the agreement, however, the Turkish president was not re-
elected and his successor lifted the opium ban. Congress responded by
enacting further threats to suspend Turkish aid if future negotiations
were unsuccessful." Despite Turkey's cooperation, the United States
treatment of Turkey today is ironic.97
While touting the Turkish program's success, many officials fail to
acknowledge that the crop substitution program that was carried out in
Thailand at the same time was a failure. The Thai government did not
pursue the crop controls as adamantly as the Turkish government be-
cause the Thai government had weak control over its territory, which
had been infiltrated by a Chinese Irregular Forces drug trafficking ring.
This powerful trafficking organization had more resources than the
Thai government and had corrupted high level government officials. A
congressional attempt to suspend aid to Thailand failed. Thailand per-
haps had leverage against the United States because United States air
bases were located there."'
As a result of the Turkish supply reductions, Mexican supplies to
the United States increased. When the United States initiated an aerial
eradication program, Mexico resisted. As a result, in 1969 the United
States began Operation Interrupt, a twenty day program of stringent
United States-Mexico border inspections. These inspections resulted in
only nominal marijuana seizures, but as intended, caused serious eco-
nomic consequences that led to Mexico's acceptance of a crop eradica-
tion program.9
95. See Note, supra note 63, at 358-360 (discussing Turkish agreement).
96. See Note, supra note 48, at 363 n.8 (discussing breakdown of the Turkish agreement and
congressional reactions).
97. STAFF OF COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS U.S. HOUSE OF REP., U.S. NARCOTICS CONTROL PRO-
GRAMS OVERSEAS: A CONTINUING ASSESSMENT, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 17 (Comm. Print 1986-87)
[hereinafter STAFF REP.]. As part of the opium ban, Turkey agreed to refine its licit opium through
a concentrated poppy straw method (CPS) that prevented its use in the illicit market. Today, the
United States has reserved 80% of the American licit market for India and Turkey, traditional
opium growers. Yet, the majority of American companies buy from India because of Turkish mis-
management and because they prefer the Indian opium that is not refined by CPS. Id.
98. See Note, supra note 48, at 371-73 (discussing problems in Thailand and the congres-
Aional posturing that ensued).
99. See R. SCHROEDER, supra note 8, at 123; see also Note, supra note 62, at 363-64, 406
(noting that the Mexican program was costly and eventually failed when the U.S. attempted to
reduce the aid). In 1979 the Mexican marijuana spraying program was discontinued by the Percy
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During the 1980s, coca eradication programs in Bolivia and Peru,
the prime coca producing countries, were implemented through aid
leveraging. In 1983, in consideration for a foreign aid package, Bolivia
agreed to meet certain eradication targets by 1986. When Bolivia failed
to meet these targets, the House voted to cancel economic aid to Bolivia
unless it made greater control efforts.100
In order to regain economic aid, Bolivia cooperated with the United
States military in a joint search and destroy mission known as Opera-
tion Blast Furnace. 01 Following that operation Bolivia was given one-
half of the previously suspended aid for its cooperation. The other half
of the aid remained contingent on Bolivia's agreement to ban illicit coca
production and to set eradication targets.0 2 The State Department
maintains that Operation Blast Furnace's significance was to convince
Bolivia to begin negotiations on such an agreement. 0 3 On February 25,
1987, Bolivia signed a three year eradication plan in return for a United
States promise to provide economic development assistance to dis-
placed growers during the fourth year. Two annexes to this agreement
outlined laws to ban illicit coca production.0 In July 1988, the Bolivian
Congress passed these laws, thus allowing the second half of the sus-
pended aid to flow to Bolivia. 10 5
Significantly, the new law prohibits all herbicide use. Although the
law originally contained no reference to herbicide use, the Bolivian
Congress inserted the prohibition after the spike controversy erupted in
the United States and after a powerful Bolivian coca lobby pressed for
this concession. In response, the United States recently has pressured
Bolivia into confiscating chemicals used by the coca growers by pointing
out that the law prohibits all herbicide use. 06 The State Department
acknowledges that Bolivian negotiations are effectively stymied until
Amendment, which prohibited aerial spraying of paraquat. The Percy Amendment was a congres-
sional response to concerns that United States citizens might be harmed by smoking paraquat-
sprayed marijuana. The Percy Amendment was amended in 1981 by Pub. L. No. 97-113, §
502(a)(1), 95 Stat. 1538 (1981), which authorized spraying contingent on the finding of a health
hazard by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291(d) (1982); National
Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. United States Dept. of State, 508 F. Supp. 1
(D.C. D.C. 1979).
100. See Note, supra note 18, at 51-56 (discussing events leading to Operation Blast
Furnace).
101. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
102. See Worldwide Hearing, supra note 25, at 64-66 (discussing the aid situation in
Bolivia).
103. Id. at 64 (statement of Ann Wrobleski) (stating that Blast Furnace brought the Bolivi-
ans to the table to talk seriously for the first time about eradication).
104. See id. at 58. The agreement calls for interdiction, a 12-month voluntary eradication
program, and then a 24-month involuntary program. Id.
105. Strategy Hearings, supra note 14, at 74-75.
106. See id. at 130-31 (discussing the herbicide ban in the new Bolivian law).
1276 [Vol. 43:1259
DRUG DIPLOMACY
eradication tests in Peru are concluded.
In 1987, after President Reagan had certified Peru, Congress un-
successfully attempted to suspend Peru's aid by joint resolution. 10 7
Since 1987, Peru has been fending off United States pressure for aerial
coca eradication by initiating tests to find a safe and effective chemical
to destroy coca plants. But the spike controversy in the United States
led to the formation of an environmental commission in Peru. Thus, in
mid-1988 Peru's tests were just getting underway. Also in 1989, in an
unrelated experiment with manual chemical spraying, a group of Boliv-
ian protesters murdered the government eradication force. 108
V. LAW ENFORCEMENT MILITARIZATION
A. The Expanded Scope of Law Enforcement
The earliest bilateral agreements relating specifically to drug law
enforcement provided United States equipment to other countries in
return for their promises to combat drug problems. 0 9 Subsequent
agreements called for law enforcement assistance, mutual information
sharing, or foreign officer training by American personnel or in the
United States. 0 The 1988 Act waived an earlier provision that had
prohibited United States funding of foreign police forces to allow fund-
ing for drug control efforts."'
In addition to equipment, training, funds, and information, the
DEA has sent agents into foreign countries to work with their police.
Initially, the DEA collected a small amount of drug intelligence in addi-
tion to its police activities. In 1981, however, President Reagan issued
an executive order that made intelligence gathering a primary and af-
firmative responsibility of not only the DEA, CIA, and FBI, but also of
six other departments, including the armed forces." 2
Since that time, the military's role in drug intelligence efforts has
expanded. Present military involvement in intelligence gathering in-
107. See Certification Hearing, supra note 2.
108. See POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 31-33 (discussing the Peruvian situation and the
herbicide issue). An American Ambassador in Lima also quit his job in protest of herbicide use. Id.
at 31.
109. See, e.g., Cooperation in Combating Illicit International Traffic in Narcotics and Other
Dangerous Drugs: Communications Equipment, Aug. 31, 1973, United States-Mexico, 24 U.S.T.
1978, T.I.A.S. No. 7709.
110. Most recently, the U.S. has concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the Soviet
Union for law enforcement cooperation in drug related cases. Strategy Hearings, supra note 14, at
71.
111. ALMANAC, supra note 9, at 88; see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
112. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1982),
secs. 1.4, 2.6 & 3.4(f). For a prior executive order on intelligence, see Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43
Fed. Reg. 3674 (1978).
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cludes surveillance by Air Force Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) planes in the Gulf of Mexico area. Also, a 1990 proposal to
expand military participation would authorize use of the radar stations
of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which
were originally created for early detection of Soviet missiles, to relay
information regarding drug movements to law enforcement officials. 113
Yet, the results of past military intelligence activities have not been
worth their costs. 114
Increased law enforcement assistance has created a number of
practical, legal, and ethical problems. For example, the increase in for-
eign intelligence activity for drug control has also had an impact on
United States criminal law. In Jabara v. Webster 15 the Sixth Circuit
found that information gathered without a warrant by foreign intelli-
gence agents could be turned over to domestic law enforcement agencies
without violating the fourth amendment rights of an American citizen.
The court reasoned that individuals have no reasonable expectation of
privacy with regard to information in the possession of a government
agency." 6
Law enforcement agents are placed in extremely dangerous situa-
tions as a result of their expanded enforcement duties." 7 DEA agents
have most recently been involved in Operation Snowcap, a series of
paramilitary missions to search and destroy clandestine coca processing
labs and coca crops in Bolivia and Peru."18 Operation Snowcap is the
most extensive involvement undertaken by DEA agents to date.
Military personnel in Bolivia have confiscated American-supplied
weapons from the police in order to gain state-of-the-art equipment." 9
113. MAGNUSON, More and More, A Real War, TIME, Jan. 22, 1990, at 22.
114. See Gest & Kaylor, Soldiers Can't Beat Smugglers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 30,
1988, at 18 (stating that "[i]n the first three months of 1988, the Air Force flew 154 hours in
AWACS radar planes at a cost of $678,000-and helped with only three arrests").
115. 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
116. This holding is problematic given the wide latitude of foreign intelligence agencies to
collect information.
117. See, e.g., The Heritage Foundation, A 15-Point Program to Stem the Flow of Drugs
From Mexico, Heritage Foundation Reports, Apr. 12, 1989 (reporting the abduction and murder of
Enrique Camarena Salazar, undercover DEA agent in Mexico, and the torture of Victor Cortez,
DEA agent in Mexico). It is estimated that in 1988, at least one DEA informant per month was
tortured or killed in the most dangerous regions of Mexico. Id.
118. Operation Snowcap involves law enforcement officials from 12 countries. The DOD pro-
vides training and logistical support. Strategy Hearings, supra note 14, at 74. Operation Snowcap
was suspended in early 1989 because of the Peruvian forces' inability to protect U.S. personnel.
Klare, Scenario For a Quagmire: Fighting Drugs with the Military, THE NATION, Jan. 1, 1990, at 8
(text available in NEXIS). The operation was resumed in September 1989 after the construction of
a fortified base camp. Id.
119. Lee, The Cocaine Morass in South America, in POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 119,
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Insurgency forces could also get control of the weapons. In addition,
American trained and funded Burmese forces have used eradication
equipment supplied by the United States to facilitate attacks on ethnic
minorities. 120 Significantly, the United States has no control over any of
the equipment that it supplied to foreigners prior to 1986. In 1986 Con-
gress mandated retention of aircraft titles by the United States,121 .so
that the State Department now has its own air force. These planes and
helicopters are most often used for eradication and are frequently
armed with automatic weapons. 122
B. The Mansfield Amendment
Despite the nominal resistance of foreign countries to the presence
of DEA or other law enforcement agents, United States domestic law
does impose restrictions on this activity. 12 Federal legislation also re-
stricts military participation in police arrest actions outside United
States territory.124 To respond to the involvement of United States
agents in the torture of an individual arrested for extradition to the
United States and to preserve bilateral relations with other countries,
Congress enacted the Mansfield Amendment in 1976.125 This Amend-
120. The prohibition on funding to police forces has been lifted only for countries that re-
spect human rights. The State Department has been criticized for not policing this requirement
more stringently. Note, supra note 63, at 407, n.308. For an example of one situation, see Nusser,
Torture, Beatings, Illegal Detentions Mark Ugly Side of Mexico's War on Drugs, The Atlanta J.
and Constitution, Mar. 11, 1990, at 135, cols. 1-5 (recounting a story of illegal detention, beating,
and torture by Mexican police and reporting that that "kind of abuse is constant").
121. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570 § 484, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
122. See Strategy Hearings, supra note 14, at 26. BINM has 52 aircraft that cost $24.5 mil-
lion. Id. at 21. Some of these craft were "given" to BINM by the DOD. Id.
123. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c) (1988) provides, in part, as follows:
(1) No officer or employee of the United States may directly effect an arrest in any for-
eign country as part of any foreign police action with respect to narcotics control efforts,
notwithstanding any other provision of law. This paragraph does not prohibit an officer or
employee from assisting foreign officers who are effecting an arrest.
(2) Unless the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, has deter-
mined that the application of this paragraph with respect to that foreign country would be
harmful to the national interests of the United States, no officer or employee of the United
States may engage or participate in any direct police arrest action in a foreign country with
respect to narcotics control efforts, notwithstanding any other provision of law. Nothing in
paragraph (1) shall be construed to allow United States officers or employees to engage or
participate in activities prohibited by this paragraph in a country with respect to which this
paragraph applies.
124. 135 CONG. Rac. S12,004 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1989) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). But
see 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (c)(6) (1988) (stating that the Mansfield Amendment does not restrict mili-
tary operations under applicable Status of Force arrangements).
125. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974); 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1930-31; S. REP. No. 841, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 1833, 1845; see also infra notes 240-42 and accompanying text (describing the
alleged detention and abuse of Toscanino by a group of Brazilian police that included United
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ment prohibited the presence of United States employees or officers
during foreign police arrests.
In the early 1980s this Amendment was increasingly criticized as
hampering overseas investigations. Thus, in 1985, after a failed attempt
to repeal the Mansfield Amendment, 2 6 Congress added an exception to
the Amendment that permitted the Secretary of State and a foreign
government to agree that United States officers and employees could be
present during foreign police actions. 1 Even under the exception, how-
ever, the United States officials had to refrain from direct participation
in the arrests. 128 Because foreign governments were unwilling to enter
into such agreements publicly, Congress eliminated the need for an
agreement with the other country in the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act.'2"
That provision provided that a United States officer or employee could
not "engage or participate" in any direct "police arrest action" in a for-
eign country unless the Secretary of State, after consulting with the At-
torney General, determined that American interests would be harmed
by nonintervention. 30
That statutory language suggested that American personnel may
engage in arrest actions in a foreign country without the country's con-
sent. The legislative history of that provision, however, indicates that
the provision was only intended as an exception to the Mansfield
Amendment to replace the unworkable requirement of an agreement
with the foreign country.' 13 Recent discussions between the State De-
partment and Congress have acknowledged that the wording of the pro-
vision is confusing, and the State Department has interpreted the
language as providing only that United States personnel may "assist" in
foreign police arrest actions. 1 2 Moreover, on December 31, 1989, the
Mansfield Amendment was again amended. 3 3 This 1989 amendment
States agents).
126. See H.R. CONF. RPT. No. 237, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 239.
127. International Narcotics Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 605, 99 Stat. 190, 229
(1985) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (1988)).
128. Despite the exception, subsection (c)(1), prohibiting direct arrests by United States em-
ployees or officers, was retained. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(1) (1988).
129. 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c) (1988).
130. See supra note 122.
131. H.R. REP. No. 798, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1986).
132. Worldwide Hearing, supra note 25, at 59-60; see 32 C.F.R. § 203 (1986); see also The
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 188 (1804), quoted in Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571, 578
(1953) (stating that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other construction remains").
133. See 101 P.L. 231, 1989 H.R. 3611 § 15. The amended statute reads in part as follows:
(c)(1) Prohibition on effecting an arrest-No officer or employee of the United States
may directly effect an arrest in any foreign country as part of any foreign police action with
respect to narcotics control efforts, notwithstanding any other provisions of law.
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clarifies the language of the prior amendment.
Thus, the apparent state of legislation banning participation in for-
eign police arrest actions is that United States officers or employees
may not directly effect an arrest, search, or seizure in another nation.
However, they may be present and may assist while foreign officials
make arrests, and can take direct action if it is necessary to their safety.
In addition, in 1988 a federal district court held in United States v.
Zabaneh14 that a court is not required to divest itself of jurisdiction if
the Mansfield Amendment is violated because Congress provided no
remedy under the Act.135 As a result of congressional and judicial deci-
sions, the Mansfield Amendment, contrary to its original purpose, pro-
vides no special protection to foreign offenders or foreign states.
C. The Posse Comitatus Act and the 1988 Amendments
The Posse Comitatus Act 136 prohibits direct participation by the
military in law enforcement operations unless authorized by Congress
or the Constitution. The Act is based on a strong tradition of separating
civil law from military activities and on the superiority of civilian au-
thorities in civil law enforcement. 37 Although the Act does not ex-
pressly limit the use of the Navy or Marine Corps for law enforcement,
as of 1981 the Department of Defense (DOD) had applied the prohibi-
tion to all of the services as a matter of policy.3 s
The text of the Act does not state whether the prohibition applies
extraterritorially. Prior to 1981, the military departments had generally
recognized the extraterritorial application of the Act, but had not in-
voked its proscriptions when an executive act authorized military in-
volvement to advance foreign policy objectives or to protect Americans
(2) Participation in Arrest Actions-Paragraph (1) does not prohibit an officer or em-
ployee of the United States, with the approval of the United States Chief of Mission, from
being present when foreign officers are effecting an arrest or from assisting foreign officers
who are effecting an arrest.
Id.
134. 837 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1988).
135. Id.
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988). The penalty for a violation is a $10,000 fine, two years in
prison, or both.
137. Note, The Navy's Role in Interdicting Narcotics Traffic: War on Drugs or Ambush on
the Constitution?, 75 GEo. L.J. 1947, 1953 (1987). Some commentators have argued that the tradi-
tion of civilian control over the military has constitutional underpinnings. Id. at 1951-53.
138. Id. at 1954-55 (quoting Department of Defense Directive No. 5525.5 at 4-6); see 32
C.F.R. § 213.2 (1986) (defining military service for civilian law enforcement as the Army, Navy, Air
Force, and Marines). The Act originally applied only to the Army because it originated as an
amendment to an Army appropriations bill. Note, A Proposal for Direct Use of the United States
Military in Drug Enforcement Operations Abroad, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 291, 294 (1988). Congress
later included the Air Force in the Act, and the Department of Defense has applied the Act to the
Navy and Marines as a matter of policy. Id.
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abroad. 139 In 1982 Congress amended the Act to clarify the scope of
military authority in civil law enforcement and to resolve the confusion
over the extraterritorial effect of the Act.
1. The 1982 Amendments
While retaining the restriction on direct participation, the 1982
Amendments authorized the military to assist civilian law enforcement
through information, equipment, facilities, training, and advice.140 The
Amendments also permitted the military to operate equipment for civil-
ian law enforcement activities. Extraterritorial military participation
was restricted to "emergency circumstances," and even in an emer-
gency, the military could not "interdict or interrupt the passage of ves-
sels or aircraft.' 4'
The legislative history of the 1982 Amendments shows that propo-
nents relied primarily on the need for more sophisticated equipment
and better trained personnel to match that of the drug traffickers.142
Military resources were readily available for this purpose. Critics of
these Amendments, including the DOD, argued that military personnel
would assume too much authority because they are not trained to en-
sure constitutional protections. In addition, opponents believed that the
preparedness of the United States military would be negatively affected
139. Siemer & Effron, Military Participation in United States Law Enforcement Activities
Overseas: The Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 51
(1979).
140. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-375 (1988).
141. 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1861. The legislative history of the Amend-
ments explained the "emergency circumstances" requirement as follows: "That definition is in-
tended to focus on the threat of large scale criminal activity at a particular point in time or over a
finite period. It should not be construed to permit use of this authority on a routine or extended
basis." Id. But see Ferraro, Bennett Hails Noriega Ouster, United Press Int'l (BC Cycle), Dec. 20,
1989, at 2 (reporting that the "Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel issued a legal opinion
on Nov. 3, at the request of the White House, finding that the law [the Posse Comitatus Act] does
not apply outside the United States"). Administration officials said that the opinion was consid-
ered before ordering the Panamanian invasion. Id. at 1.
The Justice Department's opinion is confidential, so the legal basis for the ruling is not
known. The legislative history of the 1982 Posse Comitatus Amendments clearly gives extraterrito-
rial force to the restrictions. Moreover, the 1988 Amendments list activities, including some over-
seas activities, in which the military may participate. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying
text. Direct arrests are not included in the authorized overseas activities and 10 U.S.C. § 374(c)
permits the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance for reasons other than those listed
only if the activity does not require an arrest, search, or seizure. See infra note 156 and accompa-
nying text. Furthermore, the Mansfield Amendment also prohibits direct arrests in foreign coun-
tries by United States military personnel acting without the assistance of foreign officers. See
supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. Based on these considerations, the legal basis for the
Justice Department's opinion that the Posse Comitatus provisions do not apply outside the United
States remains unclear.
142. See Note, Fourth Amendment and Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions on Military In-
volvement in Civil Law Enforcement, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 404, 417-21 (1986).
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and that this initial military authorization would lead to greater mili-
tary involvement. 14 3
Although the 1982 Amendments were intended to clarify the per-
missible scope of military involvement, the difficulty of applying the
Act and its Amendments to particular situations demonstrated that the
legal scope of military involvement in civilian enforcement activities
was more uncertain. Despite the express prohibition on interdiction in
the 1982 Amendments, courts later legitimized such participation by
holding that the Act applies to the Navy and Marines only because of
the DOD policy extension "4 and that the 1982 Amendments did not
reduce the authority that the DOD possessed prior to the passage of the
1982 Amendments.14 5
In 1986 Congress passed an amendment authorizing the placement
of Coast Guard Tactical Enforcement Teams (TACLETs) on Navy
ships. 4 1 With a TACLET aboard, a Navy ship is deemed to provide
only equipment and assistance if it apprehends a vessel and the
TACLET actually performs the arrest. During these operations, Navy
ships have fired upon civilian vessels. 47 Although courts have found
that firing disabling shots violates the Posse Comitatus proscriptions,
the courts have refrained from imposing any penalty under the Act.14
Some courts have even noted that although no exclusionary rule pres-
ently exists for evidence obtained in violation of the Act, such a rule
should be fashioned if repeated and widespread violations occur. 49
Prior to 1989, the only use of American combat troops in drug law
enforcement abroad was in a Bolivian search and destroy mission
known as Operation Blast Furnace. 5 ' Over one hundred military per-
143. Id. at 419-21.
144. See United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 142 (1986).
For a discussion of the case and the court's reasoning, see Note, supra note 138, at 299-300. But
see United States v. Chaparro-Almeida, 679 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that Posse
Comitatus proscription applies to all branches of armed services), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156
(1983); United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 375 (4th Cir.) (stating that legislative history of the
Act reveals a policy applicable to all services except the Coast Guard, which serves a law enforce-
ment purpose), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983 (1974); see also 10 U.S.C. § 375 (1988) (placing Amend-
ment restrictions on all services).
145. Note, supra note 137, at 1955 n.49.
146. 10 U.S.C. § 379 (1986); see United States v. Del Prado-Montero, 740 F.2d 113 (1st Cir.)
(describing a TACLET boarding and noting that a Navy ship comes under Coast Guard control
with the raising of the Coast Guard ensign), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021 (1984).
147. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 142
(1986).
148. Id. at 569.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1979); Walden, 490 F.2d at
373.
150. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text; Note, supra note 18, at 47-60 (analyzing
Operation Blast Furnace and applicable law); see also id. at 53 n.78 (noting a possible War Powers
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sonnel participated in a series of six or seven joint raids that produced
no cocaine and no arrests of major drug traffickers. Both the United
States and Bolivian governments hailed the operation as a success be-
cause market demand for the coca leaf and coca prices declined. One
month after the withdrawal of American troops, however, both the
quantity of cocaine exported and the price of coca were greater than
they had been before Operation Blast Furnace.151 The Reagan Adminis-
tration refused to comment on the issue of whether authority for the
operation came from the Posse Comitatus Amendments or the Presi-
dent's 1986 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that declared
drug trafficking a national security threat.152
In the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act Congress sanctioned the opera-
tion. 153 By raising the drug issue to the level of a a "national security
threat," or "emergency," the President had been able to justify all
levels of intervention. The distinction between civilian and mititary ac-
tivities had been obscured by drug enforcement practice and deference
by different branches of the government to one another's interpretation
of the 1982 Amendments.
2. The 1988 Amendments
In 1988 Congress amended the Posse Comitatus Act again.15 The
1988 Amendments were fueled by the belief that the drug war was fail-
ing and by a perceived need for better equipment and personnel. In
effect, the 1988 Amendments codified existing practices. The most sig-
nificant changes related to maintenance and operation of equipment.
The 1988 Amendments deleted the provisions that permitted ex-
traterritorial operation of military equipment only in emergency cir-
cumstances and substituted an expanded list of activities in which the
military could participate.155 The Amendments allow the military to
track the movements of drug traffickers, engage in aerial reconnais-
sance, and intercept crafts for the purpose of communicating with
them. In addition, the Amendments allow the military to transport ci-
vilian law enforcement personnel and to operate a base camp overseas
conflict). The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1982), addresses the separation of
executive and legislative war powers. The Resolution does not mention the Posse Comitatus Act
restrictions. Because the Resolution does not address the civilian-military conflict, it is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a discussion of the War Powers conflict, see Born, The President's War
Powers, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 153 (1988).
151. Note, supra note 18, at 57-58.
152. Id. at 50 n.62.
153. 1986 Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2012, 100 Stat. 3207-66 (1986).
154. See National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-456, § 1104(a), 102 Stat. 2042
(1988).
155. 10 U.S.C. § 374 (1988).
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with the joint approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense. Finally,
the Amendments authorize the Secretary of Defense to make military
personnel available to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
to operate equipment for reasons other than those expressly listed pro-
vided that the activity does not require direct participation, which is
defined as an arrest, search, or seizure.156
In 1988 Congress also expanded the use of Navy resources to inter-
dict traffickers by authorizing Coast Guard personnel commanding a
TACLET or Coast Guard ship to fire upon any vessel that does not
stop after being ordered to do so.' Most recently, in January 1990, a
Navy TACLET ship fired disabling shots at a Cuban vessel. The Cuban
vessel escaped into Mexican waters. Mexican authorities reportedly
found no drugs aboard the vessel.158 In addition, congressional and ad-
ministrative debates have now addressed a proposal to shoot down
planes over American borders that ignore warnings to land.159
Nevertheless, increased military interdiction efforts, for the most
part, have failed to increase arrests. 60 That failure has been attributed
to an inability to police all of the American border simultaneously and
to the use of military equipment that is inadequate for interdicting
drug smuggling vessels. In recent years, the Coast Guard and Customs
budgets have been cut to the extent that they are now inadequate for
interdiction operations without military assistance.' 6 ' Now, however, in-
terdiction efforts are being moved away from the United States borders
to the coasts of drug producing and drug transit countries. In addition,
the United States has pressed foreign countries to use their own mili-
taries in civilian law enforcement operations. Like the United States,
some of these countries have strong traditions against military involve-
ment in civilian law enforcement activities.162
156. Id. §§ 374(c), 375.
157. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7401, 102 Stat. 4483 (1988).
158. Mexico Finds No Drugs on Cuban Ship, United Press Int'l (Home Ed.), Feb. 2, 1990, at
1.
159. Dwyer, Marines Aren't the Answer to America's Drug Problem, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989,
at 30.
160. For example, in all of fiscal year 1987 Navy patrols assisted in only 110 arrests. Gest,
Solders Can't Beat Smugglers, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 30, 1988, at 18-19; see also GAO
REPORT BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, FED'L DRUG ABUSE CONTROL POLICY AND
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ANTI-DRUG EFFORTS, at 111 (stating that in 1987 the Air Force
committed 591 hours to interdiction, costing over $2.6 million and resulting in six seizures and ten
arrests; in 1987 the Coast Guard occupied Navy ships for 2500 days at a cost of $40 million and
made twenty seizures and ten arrests).
161. Gest, supra note 160, at 19 (noting that the Coast Guard budget was cut by $103 million
in 1987).
162. See, e.g., Colombian Drug Trafficking and Control: Hearing Before the House Select
Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1987) (testimony of Ann Wrob-
leski). Ms. Wrobleski stated that "[Colombia's] tradition probably argues as strongly as our tradi-
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In January 1990 the United States dispatched the aircraft carrier
John F. Kennedy and a task force to Colombia before the United
States had informed Colombia of such activity. While some reports sug-
gest that the United States intended to set up an interdiction blockade
off the coast of Colombia, the United States government insists that the
mission's purpose was solely to plot patterns of suspicious travel from
Colombia. 6 ' This action incensed many Colombians because they be-
lieved that the action showed a clear disregard for Colombian sover-
eignty. Significantly, Operation Hat Trick, an operation involving Navy
troops in Colombian waters, was cut short in 1984 because the opera-
tion was too costly in light of the nominal results.'6 Nevertheless, the
present policy trend appears to favor increased military interdiction in
foreign waters.
The United States provides military assistance for nonmaritime
law enforcement operations with military equipment, military trainers
and advisors, and military combat troops. To date, most of the
deployed military equipment and training teams have been used for in-
terdiction and crop eradication programs. Also, military trainers and
advisors generally have been restricted to base camps in foreign
countries. ' 65
In 1989, however, in response to a declaration of war by Colombian
drug traffickers against the Colombian government, the United States
sent sixty-five million dollars in equipment and a number of advisors
and pilots to Colombia.' 6 President Bush signed a National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD) authorizing United States military advisors
in Latin America to train troops and officials in secure areas outside of
base camps and to accompany foreign forces on drug raids. Advisors
have also been sent to Peru and Bolivia. Approximately one hundred
advisors are now in Latin America, and in 1990 an estimated two hun-
dred troops and Green Berets are expected to supplement the advisors
already in place.' 67
The United States will continue to supply equipment, training, and
advice to Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. The 1989 Act appropriates an
additional 125 million dollars for military activities in these three coun-
tries only and authorizes the provision of excess United States defense
tion against using the military in law enforcement operations and to come to a joint command, as
we saw in some of their recent raids, was not an easy thing for the government to do." Id.
163. Magnuson, supra note 113, at 22-23.
164. Id. at 23.
165. Weinraub, Bush to Let U.S. Anti-Drug Troops Move Outside Latin Base Camps, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 11, 1989, at Al, col. 3.
166. Exec. Order No. 89-24, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,371 (Aug. 25, 1989); see Weinraub, supra note
165, at Al, col. 4.
167. Magnuson, supra note 113, at 22.
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equipment to eligible Latin American and Caribbean countries for co-
operation with the United States law enforcement strategy. 68 The
United States has also already promised to give the Andean countries
2.2 billion dollars over the next five years for military and economic
functions during the drug war.16 9
Attendant to the expanding military role are congressional propos-
als to further expand this role by authorizing direct military participa-
tion in narcotics law enforcement. The most recent of these proposals
was made in October 1989 by Senator Jesse Helms. The Helms Amend-
ment, which met with strong congressional opposition, would have au-
thorized military use to forcibly kidnap General Manuel Noriega from
Panama on drug indictment charges.' The proposal was to foreshadow
United States military intervention in Panama.
3. Escalation Toward a Real War on Drugs
On December 20, 1989, in the largest show of military force since
Vietnam, over 24,000 American troops descended on Panama. The
American troops took control of Panama and installed democratically
elected President Guillermo Endara in place of General Manuel
Noriega. General Noriega fled to the Vatican Embassy of Panama
where he claimed sanctuary as a political prisoner. After eleven days at
the Embassy, he surrendered to United States authorities. He is now in
the United States awaiting trial on a number of drug related charges.17 '
The United States espoused four reasons for military intervention:
to protect the Panama Canal Treaty, to safeguard American lives, to
restore democracy, and to arrest General Noriega on drug charges. 72
The United States later claimed that it acted in self-defense because
Panama had declared war on the United States five days before the
intervention. 73 Although many member nations opposed the United
States action, the United Nations did not denounce the activity because
168. See 1989 Act, supra note 34, § 5. A previous version of the Act would have appropriated
an additional $25 million for military activity in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. See 135 CONG. REC.
H8411 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1989).
169. See supra notes 33, 41 and accompanying text.
170. 135 CONG. REC. S12,679-80 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1989) (proposal by Sen. Jesse Helms). The
Bush Administration opposed this amendment. Id. at S12,681.
171. Mashek & Kurkjian, Noriega Surrenders to U.S. Agents, Boston Globe, Jan. 4, 1990, at
1, col. 1.
172. Ferraro, Bennett Hails Noriega Ouster, United Press Int'l (BC Cycle), Dec. 20, 1989, at
1.
173. See id. (reporting government's position that the intervention was justified under Arti-
cle 51 of the United Nations Charter); see also Kinsley, Speak Softly and Carry a Cage, TIME,
Jan. 22, 1990, at 74 (discussing the U.S. justifications for intervention and noting that the White
House originally "laughed off Noriega's 'declaration of war' ").
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Panama had declared war on the United States.'" Nevertheless, United
States relations in Latin and South America are now strained.
Although pleased with the capture of General Noriega, these coun-
tries are concerned that the United States would use military forces in
their territory without consent. Most of these countries strongly oppose
use of American troops in their territory,175 and incidents during the
Panamanian invasion have probably fueled their concern. For example,
many Panamanian civilians were killed or are now homeless as a result
of the invasion. 17 6 In addition, American troops surrounded the Peru-
vian Embassy in Panama after reports that General Noriega might have
been hiding there177 and actually entered and searched the Nicaraguan
Embassy in an attempt to locate the General.
For the first time, the war on drugs has taken on its literal mean-
ing. The present state of military participation in civilian law enforce-
ment has confirmed the fears of the original opponents of the 1982
Posse Comitatus Amendments. Military involvement is routine and
each new level of involvement appears to have been a stepping stone to
the next. Moreover, United States military preparedness has been
weakened. One example of the abuse of military assistance occurred in
May 1988 when the only military cutter in the area was forced to leave
its post in the Yucatan Channel off the coast of Cuba to escort a seized
yacht to the United States. 178
D. Military Diplomacy
Foreign governments appear willing to accept United States equip-
ment, training, and intelligence, presumably out of self-interest and ne-
cessity. Nevertheless, allowing United States military participation in
civilian enforcement activities is politically risky for foreign officials.
For example, military activity in Bolivia generated sovereign resistance
that resulted in violence and anti-Americanism. 79 Thus, most discus-
174. See Ferraro, supra note 172, at 1.
175. 135 CONG. REc. S12,683 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1989) (statement of Sen. Sam Nunn). Senator
Nunn noted that the Colombian, Bolivian, and Peruvian Ambassadors had testified before Con-
gress that "[tihe last thing we need is U.S. military forces coming in here to enforce our laws. We
do not want them. If you do that, it is going to undermine the government. If you [do that] ..
we are likely to end up with a Communist kind of insurgency." Id.
176. See Kinsley, supra note 173, at 74. The number of Panamanian civilians killed is "pro-
portionally equivalent to 22,000 Americans." Id.
177. Id.
178. Gest, supra note 160, at 19 (noting that the cutter's post was left vacant for three days).
179. Following the first raid, peasants chased Bolivian police and surrounded a U.S. troop
carrier shouting "Kill the Yankees." Angry Mob Blocks Arrests of Bolivian drug Dealers, United
Press Int'l, Oct. 10, 1986. The peasants allowed the carrier to leave only after being assured that no
arrests would be made. Id. In another incident, peasant threats led American instructors in the
Chapar6 region to abandon base camps. Christian, Bolivians Fight Efforts to Eradicate Coca, N.Y.
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sions with the United States relating to military assistance are not pub-
licly revealed.1 80
One approach by the United States to avoid the repercussions of
sending its military abroad has been to convince foreign nations to use
their own militaries in drug enforcement. The United States has con-
vinced Colombia, at times, to use its military by stressing the link be-
tween drug trafficking and insurgency forces. 81 At the 1990 drug
summit, the United States, Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia signed a joint
communiqu6 stating that each country could use its own military in its
territory.182 The United States, at least conceptually, promised en-
hanced economic aid and increased demand-side efforts. 183 In addition,
economic sanctions levied against Jamaica's largest commercial carriers
have led to militarization of the Jamaican airports and seaport.18 4
Nevertheless, the use of the military to apprehend drug traffickers
remains a sensitive issue with all participants. For example, in Opera-
tion Blast Furnace both the United States and Bolivian governments
claimed that the other had initiated the proposal.' The National Drug
Policy Board later claimed that it had proposed the operation. 8 6 Con-
gress soon repudiated this assertion and reaffirmed that Bolivia had re-
quested the assistance. 87 Operation Blast Furnace probably resulted
from joint efforts of the two governments, but these claims illustrate
the political posturing that is likely to surround any agreement for mili-
tary involvement.
Times, July 27, 1987, at A3, col. 4.
180. See H.R. REP. No. 798, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986).
181. See Colombian Drug Trafficking and Control: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1987) (statement of Ann Wrobleski) (stat-
ing that the United States has urged Colombia to use its own forces in eliminating cocaine labs).
182. See supra note 33.
183. See id.
184. POLICY OPTIONS, supra note 4, at 13. The two largest shipping lines in Jamaica, Ever-
green and Sea-Land Services, have refused to transport goods out of Jamaica because of fines of
$135 million and $85 million, respectively, levied against them by United States Customs when
drugs were found in their goods. Id. at 12-13. Also, two Jamaican Banana Cooperative Association
boats have been confiscated because they could not afford the fines. Id. at 13. The militarization of
the airports and seaport occurred after Air Jamaica was fined; Air Jamaica is now nearly bankrupt.
Id. at 13.
185. Brinkley, Bolivians Deny They Ask U.S. to Send Troops to Help in Raids, N.Y. Times,
July 20, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 2 & 12, col. 1.




VI. PROSECUTING FOREIGN DRUG OFFENDERS IN UNITED STATES
COURTS
In recent years the United States has given extraterritorial effect to
its drug laws in order to prosecute foreign drug offenders. These prose-
cutions occur within a framework of both international and domestic
law and of bilateral and multilateral treaties. The four mechanisms
available to the United States to apprehend and prosecute foreign drug
offenders are extradition treaties and orders, abduction and irregular
rendition, mutual legal assistance treaties, and multilateral treaties.
A. Extradition Treaties
Extradition is the legal process through which one nation requests
another to surrender an individual found in its territory for trial or
other punishment in accordance with a bilateral treaty between the two
countries. 188 Presently the United States is a party to approximately
103 extradition treaties.189 The 1988 Act calls for greater efforts to ne-
gotiate new or updated extradition treaties and for the development of
a specific narcotics extradition treaty.' 90 This mandate seeks to over-
come both procedural and diplomatic obstacles to drug prosecutions.
1. Obstacles to Extradition
The process of extradition is regarded in international law as an
arrangement affecting only the interests of the states involved.19' Thus,
the extraditee has no standing to challenge a violation of the treaty or
to compel compliance with its provisions absent a protest by the asylum
state. Speciality and double criminality, universal principles that gov-
ern all extraditions, are also state privileges rather than individual
rights. 92 These two principles are often procedural obstacles to
extradition.
Speciality requires that the extraditee be tried in the requesting
country only on the offense for which extradition is granted. 93 In drug
cases, the United States is often not able to request extradition for a
188. Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices As Alternatives to Ex-
tradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 25 (1973).
189. Worldwide Hearing, supra note 25, at 77; see 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1988).
190. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 4605, 102 Stat. 4181, 4290 (1988)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1988)).
191. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975).
192. See Bassiouni, supra note 188, at 25; Bernholz, Bernholz & Herman, International Ex-
tradition in Drug Cases, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 353, 355 & 369 (1985).
193. Bernholz, Bernholz & Herman supra note 192, at 364.
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specific crime, such as continuing criminal enterprise 94 crimes, because
the offense has no counterpart in the law of the foreign country.'95
Some treaties overcome this obstacle, however, by allowing trial not
only on the offense for which extradition was granted, but also for any
other offense based on the same set of facts.'96
The same differences in American and foreign law have posed ex-
tradition problems under the doctrine of double criminality. Double
criminality requires that the offense for which extradition is requested
must be criminal under the laws of both countries.1 97 Traditionally, ex-
traditable offenses were defined as those listed in the treaty and pun-
ishable under the laws of both countries by a minimum term of years. 9 8
While most of the older treaties did not list the new crime of narcotics
trafficking, more recent ones list drug crimes as an offense. A few newer
treaties have simply adopted the double criminality doctrine to define
extraditable offense as any offense punishable under the laws of both
countries.1 99
In addition, most extradition treaties do not require countries to
extradite nationals and the absence of such an obligation has been a
major obstacle in drug related extraditions. Civil-law countries tradi-
tionally have retained jurisdiction over their own nationals, 00 and many
civil-law constitutions even prohibit the extradition of nationals.2 0'
Some foreign governments that have departed from tradition and al-
lowed the extradition of nationals have encountered resistance from
their citizens.0 2
Although new provisions can help overcome some of the obstacles
to drug extraditions, only a few treaties containing new provisions have
been negotiated. In addition, most of the new treaties are not yet in
194. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
195. See Bernholz, Bernholz & Herman, supra note 192, at 358-64.
196. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition Between the United States and the Netherlands, June
24, 1980, art. 15, T.I.A.S. No. 10,733.
197. Bernholz, Bernholz & Herman, supra note 192, at 355.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, June 14, 1983, United States-Jamaica, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 18, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (not yet in force) [hereinafter Jamaican Treaty].
200. Note, The Jaffe Case and the Use of International Kidnaping as an Alternative to
Extradition, 14 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 357, 365 (1984). Common-law states do grant extradition of
their nationals. Id.
201. For example, the U.S. resorted to irregular rendition to obtain jurisdiction over Juan
Ramon Matta-Ballesteros because the Honduran constitution forbids extradition of nationals. See
Honduran Leader Acts to Put Down Anti-U.S. Protests, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 6;
see also infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
202. See Hondurans Riot at U.S. Offices; Four Said to Die, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1988, at Al,
col. 1 (reporting the protests in Honduras after the arrest of Matta that forced the Honduran
president to declare a state of siege).
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effect203 and their predecessors do not apply to drug trafficking. Finally,
the United States does not even have treaties with some of the major
drug producing countries, such as Iran and Afghanistan. Yet, despite
these obstacles, the Justice Department Office of International Affairs
reports that negotiating new treaties and rewriting old ones doubled the
number of formal extraditions between 1980 and 1984.204
2. Deadly Diplomacy
The need for updated extradition treaties has received little atten-
tion from United States diplomats. 0 5 This lack of priority may be the
result of the successful use of more convenient methods of apprehen-
sion, such as irregular rendition and abduction. 06 In dealing with Co-
lombia, however, the United States has been obsessed with extradition.
This obsession stems from the fact that Colombia is the largest cocaine
producer in the world and the home of the infamous drug cartels.
Extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States began in
1979.207 Colombian criminals responded to these extraditions with a se-
ries of violent murders of Colombian government officials. In 1986 the
Supreme Court of Colombia declared the extradition treaty unconstitu-
tional.208 Since that time, the United States has been pressuring Colom-
bia on the extradition issue. For example, in December of 1987, Jorge
Ochoa, who was wanted in the United States on a drug trafficking in-
dictment, was released for the second time from a Colombian jail.209
Although the Colombian government had taken security measures to
prevent Ochoa's escape, the government had no jurisdiction over the
criminal court justice who released Ochoa. 10 The United States re-
sponded by subjecting Colombian travelers and perishable products to
stringent United States customs checks.211 This retaliation incensed
Colombians.
203. E.g., Jamaican Treaty, supra note 199; Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 4, 1982, United
States-Costa Rica, S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (not yet in force); Treaty on
Extradition, Dec. 14, 1983, United States-Thailand, S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984) (not yet in force).
204. See Schacter, Arrests Abroad, L.A. Times, July 17, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (stating that
the number of extraditions increased from 227 to 454).
205. STAFF REP., supra note 97, at 1.
206. See 135 CONG. REc. H6553-54 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Frank R.
Wolf).
207. See generally Kavass, Findel Tratado de Extradici6n Colombia-Estados Unidos de
1979: Una Comedia de Errores? 3-14 (mayo-junio 1988) (published by Centro des Estudias In-
ternacionales de Ia Universidad de Los Andes, Serie Documentos Occasionales).
208. See infra text accompanying note 219.
209. Bagley, supra note 4, at 87.




Inconsistencies in the United States position on extradition become
apparent when the Colombian situation is compared with that of Paki-
stan. The United States has had an extradition request for a major drug
trafficker pending in Pakistan since 1987. A treaty exists between the
two countries, and the extradition request has been sent to a Pakistani
court. The Pakistani government refers to this request as a "test" ex-
tradition case.212 Moreover, Pakistan has suggested that the United
States should submit several more requests for extradition to aid in this
test.213 Pakistan has never been subject to United States diplomatic
pressures because of its importance in the struggle against communist
expansion.214
Inconsistent treatment has also been evident in cases in which ex-
tradition to the United States was granted. For example, in the early
1970s the United States sought extradition of Auguste Ricord from Par-
aguay on drug conspiracy charges. A Paraguayan court denied extradi-
tion on grounds of jurisdiction and double criminality.2 15 Subsequently,
the United States pressured the government to overturn the court deci-
sion by closing down substantial lines of credit for fourteen months. 16
The extradition request was eventually granted.
In two contemporaneous cases, extradition on drug smuggling
charges was denied by the United Kingdom on similar grounds.21 Upon
denial, the United States immediately dropped the request. One legal
scholar has noted that the difference in the United States' reactions to
extradition denials by Paraguay and the United Kingdom reinforces the
Latin American belief that "gunboat diplomacy" is still practiced by
the United States. 1
B. Executive Extradition
Extradition between the United States and Colombia dates back to
the 1979 extradition treaty. On December 12, 1986, however, the Co-
lombian Supreme Court declared the treaty unconstitutional based on a
technical challenge to the signing of the treaty by the interim presi-
dent.219 Extradition from Colombia was virtually stopped.
212. See Worldwide Hearing, supra note 25, at 86-87.
213. Id.
214. See Bagley, supra note 4, at 83.
215. See Collins, Traffic in the Traffickers: Extradition and the Controlled Substances Im-
port and Export Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 706, 707 & nn.11-13 (1974) (discussing Ricord incident
and citing decision of Aug. 15, 1972, on file at the Department of State).
216. Id. at 707 n.11.
217. Id. at 707 n.13.
218. Id. at 707 (stating that "it is extremely doubtful . . . whether the United States itself
would have been willing or able to grant extradition under similar circumstances").
219. See Kavass, supra note 207, at 3-14.
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On August 18, 1989, following the assassination by drug leaders of
Colombia's prime presidential candidate, President Virgilio Barco de-
clared a "state of siege"22 in Colombia. In an unprecedented move, he
then issued an executive extradition decree that suspended a provision
of the Colombian Code of Criminal Procedure that required the Su-
preme Court to approve any extradition of nationals.2 21 This suspension
applied only to drug trafficking offenses. Under the executive order,
which remains in effect at present, decisions to extradite are made by
the National Council of Narcotics, which consists of the president and
the ministers of the government. Despite the absence of a treaty and
the provision requiring court approval, the executive decree potentially
guarantees certain rights to Colombian nationals, such as protection
against the death penalty and inhumane treatment, that traditional
methods of extradition do not. As of February 1990, fourteen low- to
mid-level traffickers had been extradited pursuant to this order.222
Nevertheless, the majority of Colombian nationals oppose extradi-
tions to the United States, and the Colombian Congress is presently
considering a referendum on extradition. 2 3 Because of the Colombians'
resistance to United States interference, United States influence must
be disassociated from the controversial decree in order for the decree to
remain viable. After the failure of the extradition treaty in 1987, the
United States sent a legal team to Colombia to find an alternative
means of extradition. Despite this legal presence, there is no evidence
that the United States influenced the creation of the executive decree.
C. Extraordinary Apprehension of Foreign Offenders
Historically, the United States has, in certain instances, avoided
the formal methods of extradition by resorting to methods of apprehen-
sion such as irregular rendition or abduction.224 These methods are
most often justified as acts of necessity based on the failure of the ex-
tradition process. Weaknesses of the extradition system are that it is
too time consuming, expensive, and complicated, and that it frequently
fails to produce the offender. In such circumstances the United States
220. 135 CONG. REC. S11,766-77 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1989) (resolution submitted by Sen.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan).
221. Id.
222. Squiteri & Kelley, Drug War Splits U.S., Colombia, USA Today, Feb. 9, 1990, at 3A,
col. 3; see also Nightline: The Drug Battle in Colombia Escalates, at 3 (ABC television broadcast,
Dec. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Nightline: Drug Battle] (transcript on file at Vanderbilt Law Review).
As of December 1989, nine traffickers had been extradited pursuant to the order and that "[s]o far
the [executive order] plan has failed.. .. To date, we haven't. . . uncovered any of the trophy
bass. ... Id.
223. Nightline: Drug Battle, supra note 222, at 3.
224. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 188.
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must choose between extraordinary apprehension or no prosecution at
all. Many officials feel that the latter choice is untenable because of the
nature of the drug offenses, the high profile identities of many of the
offenders such as General Noriega, and the public outcry for drug
control.225
Recent examples of irregular rendition are the cases of Juan Ra-
mon Matta-Ballesteros226 and Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez. 2 7 In the
past decade, the United States has obtained jurisdiction over at least
four drug traffickers by means of irregular rendition.228 Irregular rendi-
tion is generally not considered a violation of international law because
it is carried out with the consent of the foreign government.
In June 1989 Assistant Attorney General William Barr issued a le-
gal opinion, reversing a 1980 opinion issued under the Carter Adminis-
tration, that allows the FBI to abduct alleged criminals in a foreign
country without that country's consent.229 The Administration cites in-
creasing terrorist and drug cartel threats as justification of that policy.
The opinion is confidential, but State Department Legal Adviser Abra-
ham Sofaer testified before a congressional committee that the opinion
considered only domestic law and that an interagency process exists to
ensure that international law and foreign policy issues are addressed
before abduction can occur.3 0 The United States policy of abduction
presents domestic and international law issues relating to the legitimacy
of the actions of United States agents in foreign countries. Both irregu-
lar rendition and abduction raise domestic and international law ques-
tions regarding the jurisdiction of United States courts subsequent to
apprehensions outside the treaty process.
225. Abramovsky & Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending Alleged Offenders Abroad: Extradi-
tion, Abduction, or Irregular Rendition?, 57 ORE. L. REV. 51 (1977); see Nightline: Reaction to
Bush's Anti-Drug Speech, at 13 (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 5, 1989) (transcript on file at
Vanderbilt Law Review) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden) (stating that the death penalty for
kingpins is "a little bit of a red herring").
226. See United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp. 528 (N.D. Fla. 1988); Matta-Bal-
lesteros ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. 11. 1988).
227. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct.
1056 (1990).
228. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214; United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249 (5th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981); Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp.
528.
229. Ostrow, Baker Vows Full Talks Before FBI Uses Foreign Arrest Powers, L.A. Times,
Oct. 14, 1989, at 6, col. 4.
230. Ostrow, Ruling on FBI Seizures Defended in Congress, L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at
A18, col. 1.
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1. Authority to Abduct
The Administration acknowledges that the proposed nonconsensual
kidnapping would violate international law by breaching the territorial
boundaries and sovereignty of the asylum state.2 31 The domestic law
basis for the legal opinion is unclear. Apparently, United States law
neither authorizes nor prohibits abduction.232 Thus, according to The
Paquette Habana that incorporates international law into the domestic
law unless an executive, legislative, or judicial act provides otherwise,
the new ruling may even violate United States domestic law.233
Undoubtedly the decision to adopt abduction as a Justice Depart-
ment policy was fueled by the domestic law relating to court jurisdic-
tion after the apprehension is carried out. Domestic law concerning
jurisdiction to try an individual, however, should not be confused with
authorization to act in a foreign country in contravention of interna-
tional law.
2. The Court Role in Abduction
In all but one instance of irregular rendition or abduction by the
United States, domestic courts have followed the doctrine of male cap-
tus, bene dententus. 2 4 That is, a court will exercise in personam juris-
231. See Law Makers Criticize FBI Kidnap Policy, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 9, 1989, at 8 (ac-
knowledging that the conduct would violate international law unless done in "self-defense"); see
also Ostrow, supra note 229, at 6, col. 4 (statement of John Hargrove, executive vice president of
American Society of International Law) (stating that "the new Justice Department policy flew in
the face of 'pretty fundamental international law' ").
232. Cf. supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing comparable ambiguity in pro-
visions of the Mansfield Amendment).
233. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that "[i]nternational law is part of our law. . . where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision ... ").
234. The doctrine of male captus, bene dententus has been criticized almost uniformly by
legal scholars. See, e.g., Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 225; Evans, Acquisition of Custody over
the International Fugitive Offender-Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States
Practice, 40 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77 (1964); Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugi-
tives Brought from a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud. A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J. 427
(1957); Comment, United States v. Toscanino: An Assault on the Ker-Frisbie Rule, 12 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 865 (1975). But see Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United States:
The Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1 (1988). Professor M. Cherif
Bassiouni, a leading expert on extradition, has pointed out that the court decisions suggest that
the United States courts first decide on the guilt of the offender and then find a way to avoid the
legal rule that would divest the courts of jurisdiction. Bassiouni states that
for all practical purposes, the judiciary has largely abandoned any concerns for the integrity
of the judicial process in the face of practical exigencies which facilitate the work of this
government in its prosecutorial function, as well as that of other governments' law enforce-
ment agencies working together to apprehend wanted offenders or alleged offenders. The
reading of decisions gives the inescapable feeling that courts reach a judgment on the crimi-
nality of the accused and then decide as to how to avoid applying a legal rule that would
negate criminal jurisdiction and thus allow the relator to go free. The resulting signals to U.S.
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diction over a defendant regardless of the means through which the
defendant was brought to trial.23 5 In the United States this rule is com-
monly known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. 6 In 1886 the United States
Supreme Court held in Ker v. Illinois2 37 that the abduction of an indi-
vidual, despite its violation of international law, does not deprive the
court of jurisdiction over the individual. Approximately seventy-five
years later in Frisbie v. Collins,238 the Supreme Court permitted abduc-
tions from one state to another within the United States. This doctrine
has been unsuccessfully challenged in many subsequent drug related
cases.
239
In only one case, United States v. Toscanino,240 has a court held
that forcible abduction requires a court to divest itself of jurisdiction.
In Toscanino the Second Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court's
expansion of a defendant's due process rights after the Ker decision
required it to refuse jurisdiction. 24 1 The court stated that it could also
compel this result based on its general supervisory powers. Finally, the
court held that the United States action violated the United Nations
law enforcement officers are encouraging and lead to more of that practice.
1 M, BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW & PRACTICE 212 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
235. Bassiouni, supra note 188, at 27, 45.
236. See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 225, at 55-56 (discussing Ker-Frisbie doctrine).
237. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
238. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
239. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214; United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (1st
Cir. 1981) (holding that poor treatment afforded defendants in Panamanian jail did not divest
court of jurisdiction, although arrest was made at the request of United States agents); United
States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that abduction at the instigation of the
United States but without direct United States involvement in torture is insufficient to divest
court of jurisdiction); United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding no Toscanino
violation where defendant failed to show direct United States involvement in torture); Lujan, 510
F.2d at 62 (alleging that Lujan was lured from Argentina to Bolivia where he was taken into cus-
tody by Bolivian police who were not acting on orders of Bolivian authorities but as paid agents of
the United States and held incommunicado for four days prior to his transport to the United
States); Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp. at 528.
240. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). Toscanino alleged that
[he] was forced to walk up and down a hallway for seven or eight hours at a time. When he
could no longer stand he was kicked and beaten but all in a manner contrived to punish
without scarring. When he would not answer, his fingers were pinched with metal pliers. Alco-
hol was flushed into his eyes and nose and other fluids. . . were forced up his anal passage.
Incredibly, these agents of the United States government attached electrodes to Toscanino's
earlobes, toes, and genitals. Jarring jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body, render-
ing him uncons[c]ious for indeterminate periods of time but again leaving no physical scars.
... [Following this period of torture, Toscanino alleged that] he was drugged by Brazilian-
American agents and placed on Pan American Flight #202 destined for the waiting arms of
the United States government.
Id. at 270. On remand, the district court held that Toscanino had failed to prove his allegations.
398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). The court did not divest itself of jurisdiction. Id. at 916.
241. 500 F.2d at 275.
12971990]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Charter and the Organization of American States Charter. 2
The continuing viability of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine was preserved,
however, in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler,243 a Second Circuit
opinion handed down several months after Toscanino. The court lim-
ited its due process holding in Toscanino to cases in which the pro-
tested conduct "shock[s] the conscience. 2 4 4 In addition, the Second
Circuit held that absent an official protest by the asylum state, the
United States would not be deemed to have violated the charters of
international law.245
Critics of this doctrine have argued not only that abduction vio-
lates due process rights, but that it also violates international human
rights.2 46 Their argument is based on the premise that the rights of in-
dividuals in international law have been greatly expanded since the Ker
and Frisbie holdings. Recently, individuals have been regarded as
proper subjects of international law. Arguments advanced against the
recognition of international human rights are that the international
human rights laws are not legally binding; the extradition process pro-
tects state, not individual rights; none of the international human rights
instruments expressly prohibit extraterritorial abductions; and the in-
struments provide no remedy against a state regardless of violations.4
The proponents of abduction and irregular rendition have pointed
out that a deterrent to abduction is allowing punishment of the abduc-
tors. United States courts have suggested that an abductee might be
allowed to file a tort action for violation of internationally recognized
human rights.248 More recently, in the Verdugo case, the court allowed
a civil damages suit against the United States Marshals Service. 4
242. Id. at 277.
243. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
244. 510 F.2d at 65-66 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
245. Id. at 67.
246. See Bassiouni, supra note 188, at 51-59 (discussing the relevant treaties and arguments
expressed both for and against this proposition).
247. See Findlay, supra note 234, at 33-44 (arguing against the proposition that abduction
violates the international human rights of the accused).
248. See Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that
"[t]he illegal seizure, removal and detention of an alien against his will in a foreign country would
appear to be a tort ... in violation of the 'law of nations' ") (question regarding application of the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, not reached due to inadequate briefing); Jaffe v. Boyles, 616
F. Supp. 1371, 1379 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (quoting Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger and stating that the
abduction of the plaintiff in violation of an extradition treaty "may well amount to a tort in viola-
tion of the law of nations"); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Ira-la, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that plaintiff stated a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988) where plaintiff's
brother was tortured to death in Paraguay by Paraguayan police).
249. See, e.g., United Press Int'l (BC Cycle), Sept. 1, 1987 (reporting that a judge dismissed a
$110 million civil rights law suit filed by Rene Martin Verdugo because allegations of civil rights
violations were too vague, but gave Verdugo 30 days to file a more specific complaint); Schacter,
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Courts have even granted extradition of the abductors to the offended
state. 5 ' These protections are, however, illusory if the abductors' ac-
tions are characterized as "acts of state. 2 51 Generally, states' remedies
are more limited.2 52 A state often makes a self-interested compromise
and decides not to protest the abduction.
3. Diplomatic Dealing for Individuals
Two recent cases of irregular rendition illustrate the different types
of extraordinary arrangements that may be made by the United States.
In April 1988 Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros was arrested by Hondu-
ran police and flown to the Dominican Republic. From there, he was
placed on a plane to New York by Dominican officials. Once aboard the
plane, Matta was arrested by the United States Marshals Service. 53
Matta was not extraditable under the extradition treaty between Hon-
duras and the United States because the Honduran Constitution pro-
hibits extradition of nationals. 5 Yet, the Honduran government
appears to have approached the United States government repeatedly
with concerns about Matta. 5 5 Whether the Hondurans initiated the ap-
prehension is unclear, but nevertheless, Honduran officials would not
publicly have admitted to this action.
For two days after Matta's arrest, Honduran nationals protested,
creating social and political chaos. 56 These protesters threatened the
Honduran President and even bombed the American Consulate in Hon-
duras. Despite these riots, Honduras did not protest the apprehension.
Arrests Abroad, L.A. Times, July 17, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (reporting the filing of a $15 million civil
suit against United States and Australian authorities by Thomas Roessler, who was abducted along
with his four-year-old daughter by Mexican officers and "kicked" across the border to the United
States). Moreover, in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), the court reasoned that the "party him-
self would probably not be without redress, for he could sue. . . in an action of trespass and false
imprisonment, and the facts set out in the plea would without a doubt sustain the action." Id. at
444.
250. See Vaccaro v. Collier, 38 F.2d 862 (D. Md. 1930), aff'd in part, revised in part sub
nom. Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931); Bernholz, Bernholz & Herman, supra note 192,
at 379 (discussing the U.S. extradition of an abductor to Canada to stand trial on kidnapping
charges); see also Ker, 119 U.S. at 444 (suggesting that the extradition of the kidnappers is
appropriate).
251. See Evans, supra note 234 (quoting from Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of State
Rogers, to Legal Adviser Hackworth, Dec. 31, 1931, D.S. MS File No. 211.42 Vaccaro, Sarro/57).
252. See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 225, at 78-79. These remedies include an expres-
sion of apology or monetary payment. Id.
253, Reuters, Hondurans Riot at U.S. Offices, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
254. Honduran Leader Acts to Put Down Anti-U.S. Protests, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1988, at
Al, col. 6.
255. U.S. Foreign Policy and International Narcotics Control-Part II: Hearing Before the
Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control House of Rep., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1988).
256. Reuters, supra note 253, at Al, col. 1.
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In most documented cases of irregular rendition, the foreign govern-
ments have not made protests to the United States. 51 Analysts cite
common interest and intimidation as reasons for foreign governments'
silence.25 s These analysts believe that Third World dependence on
United States trade, security, or economic aid renders these countries
subservient to United States demands.25
On the other hand, Mexico protested the 1986 apprehension of
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez.260 Verdugo was abducted in Mexico by
six Mexicans, allegedly police officers, who surrendered him to the
United States Marshals Service at the United States-Mexico border.
Whether this apprehension was an irregular apprehension or abduction
is questionable.26 The United States induced the six individuals to ab-
duct Veidugo by paying them money for his delivery.2 62 Despite the
protest, the United States did not return Verdugo to Mexico.
In at least one other case, the United States has paid foreign offi-
cials to deliver an accused.2 63 At times, the United States has also been
able to negotiate a settlement after the apprehension, thus preventing
the offended country from protesting the action. For example, the
United States has granted extradition of the abductors to the offended
state.264
The United States has not yet attempted an abduction pursuant to
the Justice Department authorization. Nevertheless, foreign govern-
ments have already contacted the United States to express dissatisfac-
tion with the policy. 265
257. Schacter, Arrests Abroad, L.A. Times, July 17, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Murphy, Mexico Hits Arrest in Killing of U.S. Drug Agent, L.A. Times, June 22, 1988,
§ 2, at 3, col. 1. The Mexican government formally protested the arrest of Verdugo under both
Mexican and international law. This protest was not made until almost two and one-half years
after the abduction. Id.
261. Schacter, Arrests Abroad, L.A. Times, July 17, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
262. The six individuals were paid $32,000. After the apprehension, the United States per-
mitted them to emigrate to the U.S. because of threats on their lives. Id. But see Brinkley, U.S.-
Mexican Border Efforts Hampered by Politics and Inertia, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1986, at A14, col.
1 (reporting that the Mexicans were paid about $50,000); Schacter, Verdugo Trial Tactic Seen As
Subterfuge, L.A. Times, Feb. 25, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 5 (reporting that Vergugo's attorneys claim
the Mexicans were paid $100,000). Mexican authorities issued arrest warrants for five of the six
individuals on kidnapping and false imprisonment charges. See Schacter, Arrests Abroad, L.A.
Times, July 17, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
263. See Lujan, 510 F.2d at 63.
264. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
265. Foreign officials have already contacted the United States expressing concern that the
United States would "mount up like the Lone Ranger." Ostrow, supra note 230, at A18, col. 2
(statement of Abraham Sofaer, State Dep't Legal Adviser).
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D. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
Mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) are bilateral or multilat-
eral treaties that obligate the party states to provide access to evidence
and to otherwise cooperate in criminal prosecutions. The first United
States MLAT was not created until 1977.266 The traditional method of
obtaining evidence and cooperation from a foreign country in a criminal
prosecution has been letters rogatory, which are mere requests that cre-
ate no obligation to cooperate and which have been generally recog-
nized as inefficient and ineffective." 7 MLATs, unlike letters rogatory,
may also be used to obtain evidence during investigations. The United
States has entered into MLATs with twelve countries. Four of these
treaties have been ratified and are in force2 8 and two have been ratified
but are not in force.269 Six are pending before the United States
Senate.
1. Obstacles for Future MLATs
Both foreign and domestic law create obstacles for MLATs. De-
spite the obvious necessity of MLATs for successful drug prosecutions,
six MLATs have been pending before the United States Senate for over
two years. One possible reason for this delay is concern over whether
the MLATs violate the due process and compulsory process rights of
defendants by denying them the ability to use the MLAT process to
obtain evidence for their defense.
In Washington v. Texas 7 1 the United States Supreme Court struck
down as unconstitutional a statute barring defendants from introducing
accomplice testimony but permitting the state to use such testimony.
The Court held that the right to present witnesses to establish a de-
fense is a fundamental element of due process. Moreover, in United
States v. Sindona27 1 the Second Circuit held that the case would be
266. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, 109 REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 3 (1989) [hereinafter A.B.A. REP. No. 109] (copy on file at Vanderbilt Law Review); see
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27
U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter Swiss Treaty].
267. A.B.A. REP. No. 109, supra note 266, at 6-7.
268. Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Nov. 9, 1982, United States-Italy, S.
TREATY DoC. No. 25, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); Treaty on Judicial Assistance: Criminal Investi-
gations, June 12, 1981, United States-Netherlands, T.I.A.S. No. 10,734; Treaty on Extradition and
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, June 7, 1979, United States-Turkey, 32 U.S.T. 3111,
T.I.A.S. No. 9891; Swiss Treaty, supra note 266.
269. These are the Colombian Treaty and Moroccan Treaty. See A.B.A. REP. No. 109, supra
note 266, at 4, 5 & n.4.
270. These are the Canadian Treaty, Thai Treaty, Caymanian Treaty, Bahamian Treaty,
Mexican Treaty, and Belgian Treaty. See A.B.A. REP. No. 109, supra note 266, at 5 & n.5.
271. 388 U.S. 14 (1966).
272. 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981).
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dismissed unless a request by the defendant under the Swiss MLAT
was fulfilled. The American Bar Association, among others, believes
that the United States must provide a defendant with the same oppor-
tunity to obtain evidence as the government.273
Supporters of the MLATs argue that a defendant is not denied ac-
cess to foreign evidence because a defendant may use the letters roga-
tory process to obtain information. In addition, they point out that
under international treaty law, individuals are not guaranteed rights
unless so stated in the treaty. The ABA challenge, however, is based on
United States domestic law, and the letters rogatory process has been
recognized by the government itself as an illusory guarantee. The Jus-
tice Department argues that Congress should ratify the treaties because
the constitutional issue is one for the courts.
' Despite strong evidence that the MLATs violate the fifth, sixth,
and fourteenth amendments, some members of Congress have predicted
that the MLATs will be ratified without granting defendants equal dis-
covery powers. 5 Congress and the Justice Department oppose granting
defendants access to the MLAT process because foreign governments
are reluctant to enter into MLATs under such circumstances.76 In ad-
dition, both Congress and the Justice Department remain outraged that
Michael Abbell, a former Justice Department official who now repre-
sents Colombia's Cali cartel, lobbied both the ABA and the Senate For-
eigu Relations Committee in favor of the amendment granting
defendants equal access.
Yet another criticism of the MLATs has been raised by Senator
Helms, an avid supporter of drug control measures. He has delayed rat-
ification after expressing worries that the Mexican and Bahamian gov-
ernments are too corrupt to have access to United States law
enforcement information. Congress should give serious consideration
to this problem. The United States should not enter into MLATs with-
out a corresponding willingness to provide assistance.
2. Court Subpoenas As Diplomatic Leverage
Foreign countries have opposed MLATs because of legal and nonle-
gal considerations. The most significant legal obstacle is foreign bank
273. See A.B.A. REP. No. 109, supra note 266, at 7-8.
274. Strasser, Crime Has No Borders, So Countries Close Ranks, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 30, 1989, at
1, 40.
275. Id. at 40, col. 1.
276. Id. at 40, col. 4.
277. See 135 CONG. REc. H6553-54 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Frank R.
Wolf).
278. Strasser, supra note 274, at 1, col. 1, 40.
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secrecy law. Many countries have legislation prohibiting bank officials
from disclosing financial information about a bank customer. These
laws are based on a strong belief in financial privacy." 9 MLATs have
been an effective means of waiving a country's bank secrecy laws but
those laws attract a tremendous number of investors to foreign banks.
Foreign bank officials not only fear prosecution, but are concerned
about large losses of business if they are forced to make financial disclo-
sures. Thus, in negotiating MLATs, the United States must pacify the
foreign country's sense of fiscal privacy and concerns about loan
business.
Originally, the United States bargained for MLATs by agreeing not
to request information in tax evasion cases.280 But the main diplomatic
tool for inducing recent MLATs, such as those with Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the Bahamas, has been the threat of federal subpoenas
to obtain foreign bank records. In 1975 a United States District Court
compelled the New York branch of a Swiss bank to cooperate with Jus-
tice Department officials attempting to gather financial records by
threatening to freeze the assets of the New York branch. 81 Whether
this pressure led to the conclusion of the Swiss treaty is uncertain.
Despite conclusion of the treaty, however, United States officials
often have attempted to avoid the treaty process because defendants
challenge the evidence gathering process in foreign courts, forestalling
litigation in the United States. 82 In 1983 United States officials circum-
vented the treaty process by obtaining a federal subpoena for docu-
ments of a Swiss corporation with an American subsidiary.2 83 The Swiss
protested this action as a sovereignty violation by calling a United Na-
tions news conference and filing an amicus curiae brief on the defend-
ant's behalf.""
Moreover, in a 1982 case, a federal grand jury subpoenaed bank
records of a Bahamian branch of a Canadian bank for use in a tax eva-
279. See Ellis & Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Mat-
ters: A Comparative Analysis, 19 INT'L LAW. 189, 197 (1985).
280. Id. at 197 & n.48.
281. See SEC v. Am. Inst. Counselors, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,388 (D.D.C. 1975); see also Ellis & Pisani, supra note 279, at 219.
282. See Ellis & Pisani, supra note 279, at 219.
283. See Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1215 (1983); see also War Breaks Out Over A Rich Man's Tax Return, 288 ECONOMIST 83
(1983). For other cases in which courts have granted subpoenas against foreign companies with
American subsidiaries, see United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983), and United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 940 (1976). But see United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.
1983) (denying enforcement of summons seeking bank records located in Greece and concerning
Greek nationals).
284. Ellis & Pisani, supra note 279, at 219 & n.166.
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sion and narcotics investigation, although compliance with the sub-
poena would violate the Bahamian bank secrecy law.2 85 Canada, the
Cayman Islands, and the United Kingdom filed amicus curiae briefs on
the defendant's behalf that were critical of the United States' overzeal-
ous pursuit of foreign evidence. 86
Arguably these court orders do not violate international law. 8" Re-
gardless of whether the treaties violate international law, Congress has
authorized deviation from international standards in the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1982.88 This Act authorizes the United States government to
move against drug generated assets. Thus, the court orders are consis-
tent with domestic law. The Bank Secrecy Act is, however, indifferent
to foreign bank secrecy law and the precarious position of the holder of
information who may be penalized by the foreign country for disclosing
the information and sanctioned by the United States for not disclosing
the information.
This judicial trend toward enforcement of subpoenas against for-
eign entities regardless of conflicts of law was undoubtedly used as dip-
lomatic leverage in recent MLAT negotiations. Evidence that this
concern moved foreign governments to protect their sovereignty
through MLATs is found in the treaty concluded with the United King-
dom concerning the Cayman Islands; in return for providing access to
Cayman Islands bank accounts to the United States, Great Britain se-
cured a promise that the United States would not attempt to enforce
federal subpoenas for the bank records. 89 The United States has also
motivated foreign governments to cooperate under already existing
MLATs by allowing the foreign country to freeze and retain the assets
of drug offenders as a quid pro quo for their cooperation.90
VII. THE MEANS AND END OF SUPPLY-SIDE CONTROL
A. Drug Diplomacy
The diplomatic war on drugs has been marginally successful in im-
plementing United States programs in foreign countries. The United
285. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d at 1384.
286. Paikin, supra note 55, at 269 n.152.
287. See id. at 246 (pointing out that U.S. courts issuing subpoenas have at times professed
to follow international law, but noting that these arguments are not convincing); see also Blackmer
v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 439 (1932) (stating that no interest of the foreign country is
prejudiced by serving a subpoena in its territory). The Blackmer court focused on the fact that
serving subpoenas was an innocuous act. Id. But see FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-
Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing the coercive nature of serving a foreign
citizen abroad by registered mail).
288. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5324 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
289. Ellis & Pisani, supra note 279, at 190 n.3.
290. Paikan, supra note 55, at 269 n.146.
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States now boasts twenty-three crop eradication programs, six new
MLATs, different levels of military use throughout South America, and
imprisonment of an unprecedented number of foreign nationals. While
some of these achievements have no doubt been in the best interests of
both parties, the United States has often resorted to big stick diplo-
macy when other nations failed to cooperate. Congress has facilitated
that policy by providing the executive branch with diplomatic tools
such as aid leveraging, trade sanctions, and other fines.
Unlike the diplomatic achievements, the negative effects of big
stick diplomacy are not quantifiable and are perhaps more insidious.
Both the Bush Administration and foreign governments have consist-
ently maintained that big stick diplomacy is counterproductive. The
pressure from "Big Brother North America" has fueled anti-American
sentiment and driven the nationals of many South American countries
to support the drug traffickers.
In addition, nationals as well as drug traffickers have resorted to
violence to protect their countries' interests. The link between the drug
traffickers and the communist insurgency forces was forged in response
to United States programs, such as extradition, in Colombia. In many
instances, United States pressure has worked to destabilize the govern-
ments of countries that the United States purports to protect.291
Moreover, the aid leveraging system and the programs themselves
disregard the economic realities of the drug war. First, the ominous
presence of United States law enforcement keeps drug prices high,
thereby generating greater incentives for drug traffickers. Second, be-
cause of the enormous profits involved in drug trafficking, the United
States programs only result in displacement of the traffickers to other
South American countries. The United States does not have enough ec-
onomic leverage to maintain programs in all of these countries simulta-
neously. Third, depressed economies have forced the South American
nationals into the drug trade to support their families. Aid cuts from
the United States further depress these economies.
The big stick methods also ignore the political underpinnings of
the reluctance to cooperate in American programs. Furthermore, these
methods are often arbitrarily and inconsistently applied. Many United
States actions, such as the stringent border checks on Colombians after
Ochoa's release from prison, appear childish and irrational. In pursuing
its goals, the United States has demonstrated a growing willingness to
291. A February 1990 poll shows that 67% of Colombian citizens do not consider the United
States a "real friend." Kelley, Drug War Splits U.S., Colombia, USA Today, Feb. 9, 1990, at 1A,
col. 4. Moreover, 60% of Colombians believe that they can deal with their country's drug problems
without United States assistance. Id.
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act in disregard of other nations' sovereignty.
South American nations are increasingly pointing to the United
States demand as the cause of the problem. One academician has pro-
posed a decertification system that Latin American countries could use
against the United States.2 92 This proposal sheds light on the foreign
perception of the United States big stick policy. It asks United States
citizens to consider their reaction if the other countries of the world
decided to ban cigarette and alcohol production and then attempted to
coerce the United States to enforce that prohibition against its domes-
292. Professor Richard Craig states that foreign countries should:
opt for. . . a "Quid Pro Quo/Practice What You Preach/Put Up or Shut Up" course couched
in the form of a "Latin American Decertification Agenda." Said agenda is premised on the
following introductory clause: "We the undersigned Latin American nations propose to decer-
tify the United States if it does not 'cooperate fully' with said nations, or take adequate steps
on its own with regard to preventing drug production, drug trafficking, and drug-related
money laundering by:"
1. Eradicating, in percentage terms, as much or more of its illicit drug crops as we do.
2. Utilizing in its eradication program on both private and public lands the herbicides "Para-
quat" and "Spike."
3. Amending even further its posse comitatus statutes so as to involve its military to an ex-
tent equalling or surpassing the involvement of our own armed forces.
4. Ratifying, as several of us have, the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) which it
pushed us so hard to enact.
5. Agreeing to extradite "on call" its own nationals.
6. Ceasing to cooperate with notoriously narco-tainted reactionary regimes.
7. Cleaning up its own narco-corrupted judicial, political, and law enforcement ranks.
8. Ceasing to coddle its drug abusers, in particular its "star" abusers. Set an example for
us-send Stanley Wilson and Dexter Manley to prison, not to the Superbowl!
9. Equaling or surpassing our own sacrifices in terms of comparative budgetary allocations
and lives lost in antidrug campaigns.
10. Controlling far more strictly, as your own recently-enacted statute requires, the sale and
shipment of precursor chemicals. Do not your own analysts contend that 80-90% of these
chemicals so indispensable to the production of cocaine hydrochloride are manufactured by
American firms?
11. Curtailing the sale of such sporting weapons as the AK47, many of which end up in the
hands of our traficantes and guerrillas. After all, how many rounds does it take to bring down
a rampaging doe?
12. Coordinating its antidrug effort to the extent that it ends the notorious interagency turf
battles and is thus able to speak with one voice.
13. Permitting our equivalent of its DEA to operate in the United States with the same free-
dom of movement that we grant its agents.
14. Launching a truly concerted campaign against money laundering, even if it entails long-
term imprisonment of prominent financial figures.
15. Attacking with true vigor and far more budgetary dollars the true fount of its and our
drug dilemma: America's seemingly insatiable demand for mind altering substances.
16. Ending its unilateral policy tendencies in regards to drug control.
17. Admitting that as bad as its drug problem may be, ours is far worse. Political rhetoric
aside, drugs really do not constitute a threat to United States national security. For us, in
Latin America, they most certainly do.
Craig, Narcotrafico: Regional Impacts and the Quest for Solutions, in POLICY OPTIONS, supra note
4, at 109, 112-13.
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tic producers. Even further, the proposal encourages Americans to con-
sider their reaction if the United States failed to cooperate and a
foreign government sent agents to the United States to kidnap Ameri-
can citizens. The present drug control policy may force the United
States to use domestic programs such as crop eradication, military en-
forcement, or extradition, including acquiescence in irregular rendition
or abduction of United States citizens on demand, as a quid pro quo to
foreign nations.
B. The Bilateral Programs
Just as the drug issue is shaping American foreign policy, it is
shaping international and domestic law. By implementing eradication,
military, and prosecution programs in foreign countries, the United
States has often acted in disregard of state sovereignty and interna-
tional law. Human rights are being sacrificed as well in pursuit of drug
control. Zealous pursuit and implementation of United States drug pro-
grams threaten to undermine long-term bilateral and multilateral coop-
eration not only on drug issues but in other areas as well.
United States domestic law has also been affected by efforts to con-
form it to the extraterritorial programs. For example, the Posse Comi-
tatus Act, representing a strong American tradition, has been amended
several times in the past decade. Military presence in domestic drug
control activities is more frequent. 93 Americans are now subject to be-
ing fired on by Navy ships and might soon face the thought of being
shot out of the sky over American borders for failure to respond to ra-
dio communication. In addition, the potential for chemical crop eradi-
cation in the United States will increase as Americans increasingly grow
their own supplies. Moreover, United States courts will soon be faced
with the problem of protecting one set of rights for foreigners and an-
other for American citizens. 94
C. The End of Supply Control
These results would be bad enough if successful, but they appear
even more intolerable in light of increasing drug supplies. Displacement
is a prime problem for supply-side control. The United States is finan-
293. See United States v. Bacon, 851 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that investigation
by military personnel for assisting agencies does not constitute posse comitatus if the acts did not
subject citizens to military power); United States v. Gerena, 649 F. Supp. 1179 (D. Conn. 1986)
(holding that escort by U.S. Marshals and military personnel to New York did not violate the
Posse Comitatus Act because the military's involvement was passive).
294. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (holding that the fourth amendment does
not apply to search and seizure by United States agents of property owned by nonresident aliens
and located in a foreign country).
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cially incapable of carrying out a worldwide system of eradication, mili-
tary use, and prosecution. Also, many countries such as Iran will not
accept United States assistance regardless of coercion.9 5
Aside from the failure to control supplies is the uncertain effect of
successful supply-side control in the United States. 96 Effective control
of supplies may work to increase crime rates and black markets within
the United States. For example, successful marijuana eradication in for-
eign countries has resulted in increased marijuana production to the ex-
tent that marijuana is now a leading cash crop in the United States.2 97
In addition, synthetic drugs, such as the new designer drug "ice," are
manufactured within the United States.
The conventional supply-side policy must be re-examined in light
of its diplomatic repercussions, domestic and international legal conse-
quences, and ineffectiveness. While supply-side control may be less ex-
pensive and more politically palatable, it has not and will not solve the
problems that have moved the United States public.
VIII. ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS
An alternative United States drug control policy must be premised
on three assumptions: demand-side control should be the cornerstone;
supply-side control should be accomplished by restructuring the econo-
mies of drug producing nations; and, more resources should be allocated
to drug control.298
Admittedly, demand-side law enforcement is often counterproduc-
tive in the same ways as supply-side policy. For example, domestic law
enforcement has created a skyrocketing prison population that places a
great burden on the court system. Many prisons have been forced to let
criminals go free or face sanctions because they are operating well over
their maximum capacity. In addition, civil liberties must necessarily be
diminished in investigating crimes that are easily concealable and that
have no immediate victims.
The United States demand-side policy should place much more
emphasis on prevention, treatment, and education. At present, United
States policy makes only a rhetorical commitment to these goals. The
295. See, e.g., Wrobleski, supra note 49, at 51.
296. A 1975 White House Task Force studied the effects of the early 1970s heroin shortage
and found mixed results. The White Paper on Drug Abuse found that supply reduction at best
may reduce, but not eliminate, drug use and abuse. A. TREBACH, supra note 6, at 175. The shortage
did not reduce crime rates in American cities. Id. The task force also found that supply reduction
may foster black markets, corruption of public officials, and increased crime rates as users must
compete for scarce and expensive drugs. Id. The report concluded that no amount of supply reduc-
tion would solve the U.S. problems. Id.
297. See supra note 71.
298. Craig, supra note 292, at 113.
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United States government needs to view the problem from a
macroeconomic perspective and address the circumstances that underlie
growing drug use, such as poverty and inner city neglect. These crises
spawn much of the drug related violence in American cities.
Supply-side policy should also focus on economic realities. The
United States, in coordination with other industrialized nations, must
help restructure the economies of the South American countries to pro-
vide alternative employment and income opportunities for foreign na-
tionals. Big stick diplomacy should be replaced with an economic
reward system.
Tackling both domestic and international economic problems will
necessarily involve a greater commitment of funds. These funds will,
however, produce long-term results that the present programs will not.
IX. CONCLUSION
At present, the United States policy is result-oriented and sacri-
fices many traditional American values. The United States' efforts to
justify inappropriate means of controlling drugs by pointing to the
great need for drug control should be rejected. This assertion is espe-
cially true in light of the disappointing results and unintended rever-
berations of the present law enforcement programs. During the 1990s
the United States must foster more cooperative relations with drug pro-
ducing countries by refraining from unilateral initiatives. Moreover,
supply merely responds to demand so that the United States must fo-
cus more resources on demand-side control.
The United States government must break out of the cycle of esca-
lating present programs that seem to be failing. Their low level of suc-
cess and high costs demand a policy reassessment. In part, resistance to
a change in drug policy is driven by fears that such a change will signal
defeat of the United States by the drug traffickers.299 A drug control
policy should not be fashioned by fears, public opinion, the media, or
politics. Drug control policy for the 1990s should be shaped by refer-
ence to historical lessons and realistic views of the present.
Sandi R. Murphy*
299. See, e.g., Nightline: Drug Battle, supra note 222, at 7 (statement of Asst. Sec. of State
Melvyn Levitsky) (stating that giving up is losing in a worse way than fighting and losing).
* The Author thanks Professor Igor I. Kavass of the Vanderbilt University School of Law for
his comments and recommendations in the preparation of this Note.
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